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Smart grid initiatives are becoming more and more achievable through the use of
information infrastructures that feature peer-to-peer communication, monitoring,
protection and automated control. The analysis of smart grid operation requires
considering the reliability of the cyber network as it is neither invulnerable nor failure
free. The objective of this dissertation is to categorize interdependencies between cyber
and power networks and propose mathematical evaluation models to calculate the
reliability of the power network when considering failures of the cyber network.
This study categorizes interdependencies between cyber and power networks into
direct and indirect. In this research direct interdependencies among cyber-power
networks is studied and the concept of state mapping is proposed to map the failures in
the cyber network to the failures of the power network. The impact of indirect
interdependencies on the reliability of power system is different and more complicated
than that of direct interdependencies. In this dissertation, various aspects of smart
monitoring, as an application of indirect interdependency, are discussed and a
mathematical model to assess its impact on power grid reliability is proposed. Based on a

multiple-state Markov chain model, the failure and repair rates of power components
with and without monitoring provisions are determined and compared. In addition, to
model indirect interdependencies between cyber and power networks, the concept and
formulations of state updating are proposed to update the probability of states due to
failures in the cyber network.
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the impact of both direct and indirect cyberpower interdependencies on the reliability indices, two optimization models are
introduced to maximize the data connection in the cyber network and minimize the load
shedding in the power network
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INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background
In the past decade, the emergence of high-speed, reliable and smart computer

systems has caused a revolution in control systems in that digital systems are replacing
traditional and analog control systems in industries. Computers analyze and process a
great amount of data in a small portion of time. This advanced capability of computers
has significantly increased the penetration level of cyber control systems in physical
systems, such as electric power, transportation, water, and natural gas networks. A cyberphysical system contains two interconnected infrastructures: a physical network and a
cyber or a computer network. Cyber networks have been employed for monitoring,
protecting and controlling different types of physical systems [1].
In recent years, power systems have begun to take advantage of computer
technologies as well. Computer networks boasting peer-to-peer communication, digital
indication and protection, and automatic control are making the power system operation
smarter [2]. Cyber-power systems are being studied widely in the smart grid. Phasor
measurement units (PMU) are installed in the transmission sector to improve the
situational awareness of power systems and to predict the system’s collapse [3]. The
advanced metering infrastructure with smart meters is used in the distribution sector to
collect energy consumption data and to operate in a way that improves the efficiency and
1

reliability of power distribution systems [4]. Cyber-power systems also are applied for
the demand response. Volatile prices in retail markets encourage customers to consume
more power in off-peak hours with a cheaper price and less power in peak hours with an
expensive price [5]. Programmable washing machines and plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEV) are using smart plugs and energy management units to connect with the
grid at midnight when the demand and price is less than those during the evenings [6].
Maintaining the reliable operation of the grid requires that the crucial components
are monitored on a continuous basis and timely alarms are sent to grid operators. For
instance, power transformers are in particular critical to this mission. Any minor failure,
such as a fluid leak or progressive internal insulation degradation in transformers may
threaten the safe and reliable grid operation. The advanced monitoring and indication
systems offer opportunities to anticipate, detect, and respond rapidly to sustained and/or
impending failures resulting in a substantial reduction of failure rates, repair times,
maintenance costs, and risk of cascading blackouts [7]. One study in [8] reported that a
catastrophic failure in a bushing rod of a high voltage transformer costs more than three
million dollars, but, such a failure could be repaired easily for as little as sixteen thousand
dollars if addressed in a timely fashion. Another study in [9] specifically examined the
impact of the winding temperature indication on power transformers and concluded that it
is necessary to know the winding temperature in order to operate the transformer at a
nearly full load capacity. The failure of the temperature indicator or an incorrect
indication may undesirably impact the reliability of the transformer, in particular during
the peak loading periods.

2

Analyzing power system operations requires considering the characteristics of the
cyber network, as the cyber layer is vulnerable and is not failure free. It is worthwhile to
pay attention to the risk of failure in cyber systems for particular reasons. First of all, an
increasing usage of cyber elements in the smart grid is introducing a higher risk of failure
in the cyber-power system [10]. Second, failures in cyber elements are harder to trace
than those in electrical power elements. Certain types of failures in cyber elements are
hidden and will appear when a mal-operation occurs in the cyber-power system [11]. In
addition, the behaviors resulting in errors, faults, and failures in cyber systems are very
complicated, thus making the modeling of cyber systems challenging. Therefore,
uncertainty, unreliability and unpredictability from cyber networks adversely affect
modern power systems [12].
Previous studies investigated critical infrastructure interdependencies. Reference
[13] defined four principal classes of infrastructure interdependencies: physical, cyber,
geographic and logical. In [14], general features of interactions between critical
infrastructures were investigated based on the intrinsic dynamic behaviors of a failure
that may cause consecutive cascade failures. For the cyber-power system study, [15]
proposed a super-infrastructure containing power, computer, and communication
infrastructures with close interactions and interdependencies between them. Each
infrastructure has its own standards, protocols and governance by physical laws that
exclusively belong to that infrastructure. Reference [16] presented a framework for an
Intelligent Distributed Autonomous Power System (IDAPS), which is a specialized micro
grid for managing customer-owned distributed energy resources. IDAPS has been
divided into two separate layers, cyber and power. Agent-based communication was used
3

in this study. Reference [17] proposed a framework to analyze the extracted information
in order to detect adverse effects of cyber systems on electric power infrastructures. This
framework can consider intrusion attempts, file system updates on each computer system,
and the anomalous changes in the status of switching devices and the setting of digital
relays.
However, the ever-increasing applications of cyber network might intensify the
risk of failure and have adverse effects on the resilience of the power system [18].
Reports regarding to massive outages point out that both mal-operation and shortage in
the cyber network (such as monitoring, control and communication) are contributing
factors to degrade the stability of power system that eventually causes blackouts [19],
[20]. Reference [18] presented that failures in the information infrastructure have been
contributing significant factors in several major recent power outages.
The structure and nature of techniques that have been developed for power system
reliability analysis and evaluations [21] are not applicable for interdependent cyberpower networks as these two networks exhibit crucial differences [18], [22]. Failure in
digital devices, loss of communication, intrusion attempts, file system failures on each
computer system, anomalous changes in the status of switching devices, and the setting
of digital relays are also a group of cyber-failures that threaten the reliable operation of
the power network. These cyber-failures need to be detected and simulated by the
analyzer framework, and included in the reliability evaluation model [23]. The
monitoring device and system failures are nonetheless inevitable. Incorrect, incomplete,
and/or invalid measurements and indications may eventually cause incorrect decision
making leading to serious consequences [24]. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate the
4

reliability of the monitoring systems in the reliability evaluation of the power grid with
smart monitoring. All of the studies mentioned above have provided conceptual insights
into the reliability issue of cyber-power system. However, a quantitative evaluation is
urgently required to measure the reliability indices of modern power systems.
This chapter focuses on the cyber-power interdependencies in smart grid
applications and categorizes four types of interdependencies between cyber and power
networks. The proposed classification allows for the assessment of adverse effects of
failures in cyber networks on power network operation. Two applications of cyber-power
systems, automated substations and micro grids, are discussed in this chapter, and certain
cyber-power interdependencies are listed as examples.
1.2

Cyber and Power Networks
Electricity is generated by generators, transferred to substations through

transmission lines, and then delivered to customers using the distribution network. Each
sector of a power system contains two types of networks: power and cyber [17], [2]. The
important prerequisite of analyzing and defining interdependencies among all constitutive
elements of the cyber-power system, as a heterogeneous network, is to recognize two
separate homogenous networks. The physical connection between nodes and the type of
material transmitted in a connection are the two main criteria for splitting the whole
system into homogeneous networks. A brief description of these two networks is
presented in this section.

5

1.2.1

Power Networks
Electrical power networks are one of the world’s most complicated and critical

infrastructures. A power network is usually divided into three hierarchical levels:
generation, transmission and distribution. Similar to other physical networks, a power
network has its own physical laws and limitations due to its inherence. For instance, the
power balance at each node and the relation between voltage and power through each line
are two fundamental sets of equations that must be considered in a power system study.
Also, each generation unit supplies the power within its maximum and minimum limits of
generation. In addition, the overload on transmission lines and abnormal voltage at
substations should be taken into account. Otherwise, they will cause destructive effects
on electrical equipment and ultimately could cause the system to collapse. In recent
years, blackouts have become a vital societal concern [14]. A modern power network
should aim at delivering reliable, secure, and stable electricity to customers.
1.2.2

Cyber Networks
In order to operate the power system successfully, cyber networks perform a wide

variety of tasks. The primary tasks of a cyber network are to monitor, protect, and control
the power system. Also, a cyber network may enable time synchronization with a global
positioning system (GPS), data manipulation and fault analysis, as secondary tasks.
A cyber network consists of intelligent electronic devices (IED), servers, human
machine interfaces (HMI), network switches, network connections, and other
apparatuses. IEDs, as interface devices between the power network and the cyber
network, include measuring units, protective relays, and controllers. IEDs collect data
from the electrical equipment and send them to the server; they also apply the commands
6

received from HMIs to the electrical equipment. Network connections create paths for
linking IEDs together [25]. Network switches select paths to transfer information inside
the cyber network through network connections.
Various forms of cyber networks exist in the world, and each uses different
methods to transfer data between nodes. Cyber networks usually are categorized into
three levels, local area networks (LAN), metropolitan area networks (MAN) and wide
area networks (WAN). LANs usually are implemented in buildings with limited distances
between equipment. They typically connect workstations, personal computers, printers,
servers, and other devices. Ethernet is the most popular architecture of LANs in the
world, and statistics show that over 95% of LANs are Ethernet [26]. Several
architectures, such as star, ring and hybrid schemes, can be implemented in Ethernet
networks [27], which are very common in substation automation systems and micro
grids. Another type of LAN is the wireless local area network (WLAN), and its
application has been extended significantly in smart grids [28]. A MAN is a large
computer network that usually spans a number of buildings and interconnects a number
of LANs through a high-capacity backbone technology. A WAN is a data communication
network that covers a wide area, thousands of miles, and usually connects smaller MANs
and LANs.
Safe and fast data transmission is of great importance. Safety and speed are
directly related to each other. Greater reliability requires more time. In other words, a
tradeoff is required for balancing the optimum delay and acceptable level of safety. For
instance, data acknowledgement requires a returned package that decreases network
efficiency and agility [29]. Furthermore, delays of network switches and connections in
7

data transferring may deteriorate network performance [30]. Finally, the software used in
cyber networks requires process time for execution and may contain bugs and errors that
affect its ability to produce the desired action.
1.2.3

Comparisons between Power and Cyber Networks
Both power and cyber networks are interconnected graphs represented by nodes

and branches. This common property permits a similar structure to be defined for them
upon which can be applied fundamental graph theory and algorithms. Both of them are
bidirectional graphs on which the electricity and data can be transferred back and forth
between nodes. However, the following key differences between power and cyber
networks should be considered for modeling these two networks:
The most important difference comes from the inherent dissimilarity of data and
electricity. The power flow in power systems is unintentionally based on Kirchhoff’s
voltage law (KVL) through loops and Kirchhoff’s current law (KCL) at nodes. However,
the data flow in computer networks is controllable. Based on the Rapid Spanning Tree
Protocol (RSTP), manageable network switches are able to select a path for the data with
priorities [31].
Each network, whether power or cyber basically contains four essential objects:
nodes, connections, source points and load points. In power systems, generation sources
and demand loads are specified. However, in cyber networks, communications are
bidirectional, and each pair of nodes engages in peer-to-peer communication. A digital
device can act as both a destination node and as a source node, receiving and transmitting
data, respectively.

8

Power and cyber networks have different definitions of, reasons for, consequences
of and solutions for congestions. Congestions in power networks occur when
transmission lines reach their limitation. For instance, the unanticipated lack of
generation in one zone forces generators in neighboring zones to provide extra power
through tie lines, which may cause congestion. The high temperature caused by
congestions in power networks will damage power lines. As a feasible solution,
rescheduling generation and load shedding can mitigate the congestion in power systems.
However, in cyber networks, congestion occurs when there is a collision in half duplex
connections or queues in the output ports of switches, bridges, routers, and gateways
[30]. Usually, cyber congestion will result in communication delays and data loss.
Quantitative parameters such as current and voltage are used to evaluate the
condition of power systems. However, connectivity, interoperability and synchronization
are important for the assessment of cyber systems.
1.3

Cyber-Power Faults
In this section, the failures possible in cyber networks are introduced. Network

structures and data communication faults cover physical and logical integrity problems in
network communication. Software and security faults are two newly introduced problems
that do not have an equivalent in traditional hard-wired control, protection, and
monitoring. Environmental faults are the last category of faults that may lead to other
failures in the cyber network.

9

1.3.1

Upstream Faults
Upstream faults represent faults occurring in the upstream level from the station

level, dispatching center, or a remote-access user that then are transferred to the local
control network. Upstream faults are particularly challenging because the server cannot
recognize that a problem exists [32]. To minimize the risk of upstream faults, redundant
content sources, which consist of redundant human machine interfaces (HMIs) and
redundant gateways, usually are implemented in the upstream level.
1.3.2

Downstream Faults
The downstream level is the key enabler of the cyber network, and the

corresponding devices usually are responsible for collecting data, executing commands,
and protecting and controlling the power network. Thus, as compared to the upstream and
interface levels, failures in this level will impact the operation of the power network more
severely. The failure of an IED or a server, or one of a server’s downstream components,
such as a file server, is considered a downstream fault [33].
1.3.3

Cyber-Power Interface Faults
The interface layer is the lowest level that connects directly to the power

network. The cyber and power networks are interconnected through the interface layer.
The proper control, protection, and monitoring of the power system strongly depend on
the data gathered in the interface level from power equipment [22]. Likewise, digital data
must be received by devices located in the interface level, and the system must operate in
a timely manner [34]. Any failures in the interface units will prevent the cyber and power
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networks from interacting correctly. Redundancy is easy to achieve in the interface level
and is thereby highly recommended.
Merging Units (MUs) gather multiple analogue and binary inputs from switchgear
equipment, such as current transformers (CTs), voltage transformers (VTs) and circuit
breakers (CBs), through copper wiring. They then produce multiple time-synchronized
serial unidirectional multi-drop outputs, transmitting them to the process bus as data
through the digital network [35], [36].
Actuators convert digital data streams into electricity voltages and currents to
actuate breaker and switch coils. The operation of actuators can be customized to meet
the individual requirements of the utility. Actuators are designed to fit existing
switchgear non-intrusively and provide both remote and manual modes of operation.
However, actuator failures obstruct the access needed to operate the corresponding CB or
disconnect switch.
1.3.4

Network Structure Faults
A network structure implements data communication among various levels of the

cyber network. This inter-level network consists of connectors and data-routing devices.
The majority of problems that prevent data communication in the cyber network occur at
the lowest layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, physical layer, which
includes cabling, network interface cards (NICs), routers, and switches. Both wired and
wireless signaling are controlled in the physical layer, as well [37]. Network connectivity
faults appear as a permanent or intermittent inability to communicate with a network or
perform network-related functions. Network connectivity problems occur for different
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reasons, such as a defective cable, improper termination or splicing, external noise,
excessive cable length, bad NICs and failed routing devices.
Network interface cards (NICs), hardware connecting a computer to the entire
network, act as intermediaries between nodes and connections. The NIC makes possible
the digital communication using a specific physical layer and standard data link layer.
In digital networks, cable failures constitute the majority of network structure
failures in data transmission [38]. If a cable between two nodes becomes disconnected by
being either cut or unplugged, the network topology will change; in that case, data
communication systems must allocate another communication path. When a cable is
crushed, bent, scratched, folded, or partially severed, the bit error rate (BER), the
probability that a bit will change while transmitting through a connection [29], increases
significantly. If a packet is detected to be distorted during transmission due to the BER,
the transmitter must resend the packet.
Another crucial problem is noise affecting a wireless or wired signal, which
usually emanates from electromagnetic interface (EMI) sources of high-voltage
equipment and improper grounding. A negative frame sequence check, a fault occurring
when the sending node does not match the checksum determined from the received data,
signifies noise on the LAN interface or cabling. Shielded cables are best suited for
deployment in adjacent to high-voltage switchgears, preventing the impact of noise on
signals. However, it increases the cross-talk phenomenon, which is, in fact, internal noise
[29].
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1.3.5

Data Communication Faults
Data communication faults complement network structure faults because they

include logical faults that occur inside the entire network. The integrity of two points in a
digital network does not necessarily guarantee data communication; various prerequisites
must be met to maintain proper data communication. Despite the prevalence of network
structure faults, no metric or troubleshooting tool exists to identify such faults, so logical
connectivity problems usually are more difficult to diagnose, isolate, and resolve than
network structure problems [39].
Even if all of the configurations of two clients match, these two clients still may
not receive identical responses when communicating with an individual node. These
compatibility issues, both hardware-specific and software-specific, occur for various
reasons. Hardware-specific issues include any conflict between pieces of equipment
inside the network that cause the failure of the software or hardware to communicate
properly with a group of devices in the entire network. A protocol is a task-specific
language that the computers on a network use to talk to one another. Software-specific
issues or protocol mismatches are prevalent compatibility issues in a computer network
that cause a node to fail to find a group of nodes on the network [40].
1.3.6

Software Faults
In traditional control, protection, and monitoring systems, failures occur primarily

because of problems in the mechanical moving parts or electrical wiring. However, in
modern solutions, all protection and control operations are implemented by using
variables and applying mathematical and logical operations through software. Software
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has emerged as an independent element with an intrinsic risk of failure. Nevertheless,
there is no explicit, clear definition of software faults.
Each piece of software is built from codes developed in a specific programming
language. Although debugged completely, software bugs, known as run-time errors, can
evolve. Moreover, the developed algorithm may not be completely correct and allinclusive. The probability of future failures is related to various factors including, but not
limited to, the number of variables, opcodes, operands, subroutine, and keywords. So,
more complicated software designs lead to more expected failures [41].
All software contains a database that collects the internal settings and
configurations. Any unexpected disruption or data mismatch occurring in the database
will impact the software’s operation directly [42].
Reference [38] and [43] reported that most software failures are caused by
incompatibilities among the specifications of recently installed software, existing
software, the operating system, and hardware requirements.
Operational faults encompass failures caused by incorrect engineering and design
in the cyber network that lead to failures in the power system. Incorrect logic engineering
causes the power system to incorrectly prevent or authorize the requested commands.
1.3.7

Security Faults
Access to the communication data system by unauthorized persons or software

can seriously damage the data and the system. Some data may not have intrinsic value but
may contain sensitive information that must be protected against hacking. More
importantly, intrusion can stop the operation of the control and protection system or
execute unwanted commands, such as opening or closing breakers, with irreparable
14

consequences. Intrusions are mostly initiated by malwares, programs or pieces of code
designed to interrupt or damage a system and its resources. Viruses, Trojan horses,
worms, and bots are some well-known malwares [44].
1.3.8

Environmental Faults
Environmental faults refer to failures outside the scope of the cyber network that

impact the operation of cyber devices and networks. In other words, all parts of the
network are perfectly designed to cooperate with each other, but some special conditions
may cause non-technical failures.
The most likely and crucial environmental fault is power loss. Power loss
typically results from a failure in the distribution power system, a switch-over among
sources, or surges or intolerable voltages on the power supply. Even a momentary loss of
power to any part of the data communication system resets and de-energizes devices and
can cause the system to fail.
1.4

Interdependencies between Cyber-Power Networks
Interconnected networks are mutually twisted to each other at some points. This

interdependency generally means that the correct and appropriate operation of one
element depends on the existence and proper function of some other elements. At first,
four interactions between power and cyber networks are recognized as follows:
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o Direct interaction causes the failure of or changes the behaviors of the element.
o Indirect interaction does not cause the failure of or change the behaviors of the
element but will impact the performance of the element against the failure.
o Element-Element interaction refers to the interaction between elements that are
physically/logically interconnected between cyber and power networks.
o Network-Element interaction evaluates the impact of the performance of one network
on the element in the other network.
Therefore, four types of interdependencies are categorized in this section: Direct
Element-Element Interdependencies (DEEI), Direct Network-Element Interdependencies
(DNEI), Indirect Element-Element Interdependencies (IEEI), and Indirect NetworkElement Interdependencies (INEI).
1.4.1

Direct Element-Element Interdependency
The simplest interdependency is DEEI, which means that failures in a group of

elements in one network either cause the failure of or change the specification of one
element in the other network. DEEI is always found in points interconnected between the
cyber and power networks. For example, the failure of a controller in the cyber network
may lead to the failure of the physically connected circuit breaker in the power network.
Figure 1.1 presents two DEEI examples. The failure of controller C1 in the cyber network
will lead to the failure of the physically connected circuit breaker CB1 in the power
network.
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Figure 1.1

1.4.2

Schematic drawing of a cyber-power connection in a smart grid network

Direct Network-Element Interdependency
The Direct Network-Element Interdependency (DNEI) means that the

performance of one network causes the failure of or changes the specification of the
element in the other network. To evaluate the impact of these failures, a network analysis
has to be executed to assess its performance and find DNEI between the cyber and the
power network. Figure 1.1 also can be used to explain DNEI. The operator can
successfully send a close or open command from the HMI to circuit breaker CB1 if the
connectivity between HMI and controller C1 in the cyber network can be established.
The failure of switch S2 in the cyber network does not mean that the data stream cannot
flow from the HMI to controller C1 because there is an alternative for the data transfer
via switch S3. Therefore, the connectivity check in the cyber network should be
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implemented to determine the impact of the cyber network’s performance on circuit
breaker CB1.
1.4.3

Indirect Element-Element Interdependency
The Indirect Element-Element Interdependency (IEEI) means that failures of a

group of elements in one network do not directly and immediately cause the failure of or
change the behaviors of the element in the other network, but will impact the
performance of the element against the potential failure. Such interdependency may
either increase the risk of new failures on the element or defer the response to the current
failure on the element. For example, one of the functions of cyber networks is to monitor
the power system using indicators which can report the forthcoming failure on the
element in the power network. Failure of indicators does not instantly impact the power
supply but is increasing the risk of failure in the power system.
The failure on these indicators will increase the failure rate of the power element,
as the operator is not able to be aware of the current situation of the element in order to
make corrective actions to avoid a serious failure before it occurs. In addition, the failure
of indicators will hide the failure on the power element. Thus, the repair time of the
power element will increase as the failure of the indicated power element remains in the
power network and will be observed until the periodical maintenance appears on it.
1.4.4

Indirect Network-Element Interdependency
The Indirect Network-Element Interdependency (INEI) means that the

performance of one network does not directly and immediately cause the failure of or
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change the behaviors of the element in the other network but will impact the performance
of the element against the potential failure.
The protection task is an example of INEI. Distance protection, pilot protection
for short lines, and circuit breaker failure protection use peer-to-peer communication
between protective devices for decision making. Any failure in the communication sector
causes mal-operation or mal-operation of protective device when needed. Distance
protection, pilot protection for short lines, and circuit breaker failure protection use peerto-peer communication between protective devices for decision making. Note that a
failure in the protection system does not cause a failure on the power equipment.
However, such a protection system with failures may not clear the fault that occurred in
the power network. Figure 1.2 shows an example for INEI. Usually, there are primary
and backup protections against the fault on feeder F1. Protective relay R1 will operate the
primary protection, and protective relays R1, R2, R3 and R0 will communicate with each
other and serve as the backup protection if the protective relay R1 fails to operate circuit
breaker CB1. Therefore, if a communication problem exists on connections between R1R2 and R2-R3, protective relay R2 will be isolated and will not receive the backup trip
request from the failed R1. As a result, CB2 cannot open to isolate feeder F2 from the
fault on feeder F1.
1.5

Applications
In this section, two smart grid applications, automated substation and micro grid,

are presented for studying the cyber-power interdependencies.
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Figure 1.2

1.5.1

Failure in protection system as an INEI between cyber and power layers in
distribution grids

Automated Substation
An automated substation is a substation that is monitored, protected and

controlled by the substation automation system (SAS). The SAS is a cyber network that
collects data from the power equipment in a substation, such as incoming and outgoing
feeders, transformers, circuit breakers (CBs) and disconnect switches (DSs). The data are
processed in SAS, and the proper commands are released to operate the power
equipment, including changing the tap of transformers and opening or closing CBs and
DSs.
SAS technology is gradually superseding conventional control systems.
Nowadays, the SAS integrates advanced monitoring, protection and control devices and
operates as a combined and multi-task network. Fiber-optic transceivers on the power
equipment, such as CBs, DSs, current transformers, and voltage transformers, are
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replacing the large amount of traditional copper wiring. The IEC-61850, a novel standard
for communication in the substation automation, provides interoperability, reliability and
agility in the communication systems [36]. As more tasks are assigned to the SAS,
failures in the SAS become more critical. Any failure in SAS operation may cause
failures in the power network and may even disconnect power feeders in the substation
[45].

Figure 1.3

a) Schematic diagram of a breaker-and-a-half substation, b) schematic
diagram of substation automation systems

Figure 1.3.a shows a substation with a typical breaker-and-a-half arrangement.
Figure 1.3.b shows a schematic diagram of its SAS. Power equipment transceivers are
interface apparatuses between the power and cyber networks. Measurement, protection
and control IEDs, such as bay control units (BCUs), protective relays and measuring
units, are the main devices in the SAS and are connected together through an Ethernet
network. BCUs monitor and control each bay, and peer-to-peer communication enables
BCUs to share information with other cyber elements. They report all statuses and values
of switchgears to other IEDs [35]. Protective relays protect the substation and all
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connected lines against faults. Furthermore, measuring units collect measured current and
voltage and calculate powers and energies.
The measuring accuracy of CTs and VTs, and the correct status of CBs and DSs,
are important concerns for the automated substation because inaccuracies in CTs and
VTs, as well as false statuses from CBs and DSs, may lead to incorrect monitoring,
undesirable protective trip command, or insecure control. So, the DEEI can be defined
between CTs, VTs, CBs, or DSs and their corresponding BCUs and protective relays.
The DNEI defines the interactions between the cyber network and the power
equipment, including transformers, CBs and DSs. The operator should be able to send a
command to all of them. Problems in the connectivity, interoperability and
synchronization inside the cyber network may disturb the data transfer to BCUs, which
are required for changing the tap of transformers, and the status of CBs and DSs.
The indication of transformers and the circuit breaker operation counter are two
examples of IEEI. The temperature indicators of windings and the oil of transformers are
monitored in substations, and any out-of-range degree activates the alarm units. A failure
on these indicators increases the failure rate of the transformer, as temperature indicators
cannot help to announce that the power transformer is under the hazard while failed. As
another example, CBs usually have a maintenance requirement after a specified number
of operations. If the HMI software for counting the number of CB operations experiences
a problem, it will not report the correct operation number for scheduled maintenance.
Consequently, CBs operating while ignoring their maintenance will increase the risk of
damage.
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In the automated substation, peer-to-peer communication is crucial for the
protection task. The directional overcurrent and pilot protections are examples of
operations requiring inter-substation communication, and the bus bar, circuit breaker
failure, pole discordance and short zone protections are examples of operations requiring
in-substation communication between relays. As an INEI example, the failure in the
cyber network potentially decreases the ability of power feeders and bus bars to defend
against faults.
1.5.2

Micro Grids
The concept of a micro grid developed out of the need to organize and utilize the

distributed generation and renewable energy that occur in the modern distribution system.
Micro grids aggregate renewable energies with conventional power systems [16]. Like
other power grids, the main objective of micro grids is to supply power to local
consumers from sources that are distributed generations (DGs), batteries or incoming
feeders from the bulk power grid [46]. A micro grid is an application of a cyber-power
system that takes advantage of computer networks in control of small power networks.
The following problems should be considered in micro grids:


Renewable energy resources are usually small [47].



The availability of sources in micro grids depends on ambient conditions
[47], [48].



There is not a slack bus in micro grids to balance load and generation,
especially when the micro grid is isolated from the bulk power system
[49].
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Considering the above problems, energy management units (EMU) are important
devices in micro grids for managing resources to balance loads and generations. EMUs
continuously run real-time optimum energy management algorithms with the objectives
of maximizing benefits and minimizing load curtailments and system losses, and they
make optimal decisions on the amount of generations, charging/discharging of batteries,
demand response of customers, and selling to or buying from the bulk power system.

Figure 1.4

A schematic diagram of a micro grid a) the power network b) the cyber
network

The protection of the micro grid is another important issue. The traditional
protection schemes are not able to protect the micro grids appropriately because of the
utilization of DGs, which changes the simple radial topology of distribution networks
into meshed networks with bi-directional current flows [50]. Hence, fault management
units (FMU), operating based on multi-agent technology, are the new generation of
protective relays capable of peer-to-peer communication which are used for the
protection of micro grids [51], [52].
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Figure 1.4.a shows a schematic diagram of the power network in a micro grid.
The power network includes the incoming feeder from the bulk power system,
distribution transformers, renewable energy resources, distribution cables, batteries, plugin hybrid electrical vehicle (PHEV) and smart loads. Figure 1.4.b shows a schematic
diagram of the cyber network of a micro grid. The cyber network includes EMUs, FMUs,
servers, switches and smart meters. All devices in the power network of micro grids have
data connection ports to transmit and receive signals from EMUs and FMUs. Smart
meters are digital instruments that measure generated/consumed power for source and
load points [53].
Because each EMU is in charge of each section in the micro grid, the insolated
EMU will cause all power elements in the corresponding section to operate abnormally
due to the cyber connectivity problem. Such interaction is the DNEI. Advanced power
electronic technology has offered solid state transformers (SST) instead of conventional
transformers [54]. So, this interconnection between the cyber network and the SST can be
also defined by DNEI.
The indication of battery level is an example of the IEEI because the lack of
battery power can increase the risk of a power outage in the micro grid while the battery
is operated as a source.
The demand response (DR) potentially prevents the power network from critical
outages by curtailing voluntary customers or shifting loads instead of generating [34].
The DR is applied by the cyber network between all customers. The failure of the cyber
network to implement the DR does not cause any consequent failures in the operation of
the micro grid. However, the failure in the operation of the DR reduces the reserve
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margin and the sustainability of the micro grid, accordingly increasing the risk of load
curtailment. In other words, if the failed DR is not able to curtail voluntary customers or
unimportant loads when an outage occurs in the power network, the other essential loads
will be forced to leave the power system. Therefore, the DR can be regarded as an
example of INEI.
1.6

Contributions
Major contributions of this dissertation are listed below:


Based on the nature and place of failures in the cyber network, four types
of cyber-power interdependencies are categorized: Direct ElementElement Interdependencies (DEEI), Direct Network-Element
Interdependencies (DNEI), Indirect Element-Element Interdependencies
(IEEI), and Indirect Network-Element Interdependencies (INEI).



To model direct interdependencies (DEEI and DNEI) new concept of state
mapping is proposed in which failures in the cyber network are mapped to
the power network. An optimization model is proposed to maximize the
data connection in the cyber network with multiple data sources.



A multiple-state Markov chain model is proposed for reliability modeling
and evaluation of the power system with smart monitoring devices. In this
model, the prevented and corrected states, and monitoring degree of the
power equipment with smart monitoring devices are defined. The impact
of monitoring device failures is incorporated into the proposed reliability
assessment model and a reduced model is proposed to facilitate the
reliability evaluation.
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To model indirect interdependencies between cyber and power networks a
reliability assessment algorithm is presented. The concept and
formulations of state updating are proposed to update the probability of
states due to failures in the cyber network.

1.7

Parts of the Dissertation
The reminder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on

direct interdependencies among cyber-power networks. In this chapter a new concept of
state mapping is proposed to map the failures in the cyber network to the failures of the
power network. Chapter 3 discusses various aspects of smart grid monitoring, as an
application of indirect interdependency, and proposes a mathematical model to assess its
impact on power grid reliability, based on a multiple-state Markov chain model. Chapter
4 focuses on concepts and calculation methodologies of indirect interdependencies
between cyber and power networks. The concept and formulation of state updating are
proposed to update the probability of states due to failures in the cyber network. Chapter
5 provides a brief introduction about a piece of software developed to apply these models
on different smart grid applications. Finally, the conclusion drawn from discussions in
this dissertation is provided in chapter 6.
1.8

Conclusion
This chapter describes a cyber-power system in smart grid applications and

studies the interdependencies between cyber and power networks. In this study, Direct,
Indirect, Element-Element, and Network-Element, as fundamental interactions between
two networks, are introduced, and four categories of interdependencies, DEEI, DNEI,
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IEEI, and INEI, are defined. In this chapter, two applications, automated substation and
micro grid, are discussed, and certain interdependencies are investigated and categorized.
Based on this study, the mathematical model will be developed for quantitatively
evaluating the effects of interdependencies in the cyber-power system.
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CHAPTER II
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF SMART GRID CONSIDERING DIRECT CYBERPOWER INTERDEPENDENCIES

2.1

Introduction
Smart grid initiatives are becoming more and more achievable through the use of

information infrastructures that feature peer-to-peer communication, monitoring,
protection and automated control [55]. Power, information, and communication
infrastructures are creating a so-called “cyber-physical power system”. Each
infrastructure has its own standards and protocols and is governed by physical laws
belonging exclusively to that infrastructure [15]. The development and accessibility of
the information technology has increasingly conveyed to power systems considerable
economic benefits and reliability improvements [56]. In the economic viewpoint, the
smart grid technologies enable the grid to operate with lower marginal limits and utilize
the resources more efficiently because more precise and trustful data on the state of the
power system is achievable [18]. Most significance from the reliability perspective is the
capability of self-healing, which can recognize and isolate the faulted domain, reenergize
the non-faulty part automatically, and reduce the outage time [57].
This chapter proposes a reliability assessment algorithm which can effectively
consider the impact of cyber network failures on power networks. Major contributions
are summarized as follows:
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Based on the nature and place of failures in the cyber network, four types of
cyber-power interdependencies are categorized: Direct Element-Element
Interdependencies (DEEI), Direct Network-Element Interdependencies (DNEI), Indirect
Element-Element Interdependencies (IEEI), and Indirect Network-Element
Interdependencies (INEI).
An innovative algorithm is developed to evaluate the impact of direct cyberpower interdependencies (DEEI and DNEI) on the reliability indices, such as loss of load
probability (LOLP) and expected energy not served (EENS).
1. Probabilistic evaluation of cyber and power network is presented in a
probability table named P-Table in which equivalent states are integrated.
2. A new concept of state mapping is proposed to map the failures in the
cyber network to the failures in the power network. With the state
mapping, the ability of running two heterogeneous networks becomes
possible.
3. An optimization model is proposed to maximize the data connection in the
cyber network with multiple data sources.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 defines basic concepts
about interdependencies. Section 2.3 discusses the reliability evaluation of cyber-power
networks considering the direct interdependencies. In Section 2.4, a smart microgrid, as
an application of cyber-power systems, is studied to justify the effectiveness of the
proposed algorithm. Finally, the conclusion drawn from discussions in this chapter is
provided in Section 2.5.
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2.2

Definition of Cyber-Power Interdependencies
Cyber-power network is known as an interconnected network which is mutually

twisted to each other at some points and makes interdependencies. The interdependency
generally means that the correct and appropriate operation of one element depends on the
existence and proper function of some other elements. Failure in the cyber network may
cause various effects in the power network. Four types of interdependencies are
categorized in this section: Direct Element-Element Interdependencies (DEEI), Direct
Network-Element Interdependencies (DNEI), Indirect Element-Element
Interdependencies (IEEI), and Indirect Network-Element Interdependencies (INEI) [58].
Figure 2.1 shows these four types of interdependencies between the cyber and power
networks. Note that the impact of the failure in one element or a subset of one network
can be divided into impacts of multiple Network-Element failures. In other words, the
definition of Network-Element interdependencies can cover Network-Network
interdependencies.
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Figure 2.1

2.3

Four types of interdependencies between cyber and power networks

Cyber-Power Reliability evaluation Algorithm
In this chapter, the proposed cyber-power reliability algorithm is for direct

interdependencies (DEEI and DNEI) between the cyber network and the power network.
The algorithm for indirect cyber-power interdependencies (IEEI and INEI) is beyond the
scope of this chapter and will be discussed in the chapter 4.
2.3.1

Definitions
Three key concepts in the proposed algorithm including P-Table, Cyber-Power

Link and State Mapping are defined as follows.
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2.3.1.1

P-Table
The P-Table collects information from various states of a system. A P  Table

consists of three terms: index i, system state Фi, and probability PrΦi . Each state Фi is
defined in the form of an array in which each element refers to the status of a real device
in the cyber and power networks (2.1).
Φi  ( i,1 , i,2 ,..., i,N C , i,N C 1 ,..., i,N C  N P )

(2.1)

where, φi,k is the status of element k in the state i. The value of zero for φi,k means
that element k is in-service and the value of one represents the outage of element k. NC
and NP represent the total number of elements (including nodes and connections) in both
cyber and power networks, respectively. Assume that all elements have two statuses, outof-service and in-service, a cyber-power network with NC+NP elements consequently has

2

( Nc N p )

different system states.
The order of each state represents the total number of outaged elements associated

with that state and is defined as:
Nc  N p

Order(Φi )    ik
k 1

(2.2)

The probability of state i is calculated as:
Nc  N p

PrΦi   Ak
k 1

( 1 ik )

Uk

 ik

where Ak and Uk represent the availability and unavailability of the element k,
respectively, and are calculated as:
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(2.3)

U k  1  Ak 

λk
λk  μk

(2.4)

where λk and µk are the failure rate and repair rate of element k, respectively.
In this chapter, a two-state model is assumed for both power and cyber devices.
However, it is not difficult to extend the proposed algorithm for multi-state devices. For
power devices such as generating units, transformers, transmission lines and loads, to
calculate the probability of their states requires transition rates among all the states, and
the most applicable method is the Markov chain model. But, for cyber devices, the
prorated operation does not have an understandable application. For example, although
the bit error rate increases in defective cables, such as those that are crushed, bent,
scratched, folded, or partially severed, the connection between two nodes still exists.
Therefore, a two-state model is generally used for cyber devices.
2.3.1.2

Cyber-Power Link (CP-Link)
A cyber-power link (CP-Link) shown in (2.5) represents a physical or logical

relationship between the element γ in the cyber network and the element δ in the power
network, which means that if the cyber element γ fails or does not receive the required
data, the power element δ stops working.

D  ( :  )
2.3.1.3

(2.5)

Concept of State Mapping
State-mapping happens when a failure in an element of cyber network causes that

an element in the power network fails or cannot work appropriately. State-mapping
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represents a procedure in which the probability of a state completely transfers to another
state. Equation (2.6) represents that the state Фi is mapped to the state Φi' .
Φi  Φi'

(2.6)

As a result, the probabilities of two states are updated as:

PrΦ'  PrΦi  PrΦ'
i

i

PrΦi  0

(2.7)

The equation (2.7) is proved as below:
Proof: When the failure (Fc) in the cyber network causes that the failure (FP)
happens in the power network, we can get
Pr(FC  FP )  Pr(FC  FP' )
 Pr((FC  FP )  (FC  FP' ))  Pr((FC  FP )  (FC  FP' ))
 Pr(FC  (FP  FP' ))  0

(2.8)

 Pr(FC )

Since the occurrence of Fc without occurrence of FP is logically impossible, the
equation (2.9) holds obviously,
Pr( FC  FP' )  0

(2.9)

Thus, the equation (2.8) can be rewritten as
Pr(FC  FP )  Pr(FC )

Similarly, we can also get
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(2.10)

Pr(FC  FP )  Pr(FC'  FP )
 Pr((FC  FP )  (FC'  FP ))  Pr((FC  FP )  (FC'  FP ))
 Pr((FC  FC' )  FP )  0

(2.11)

 Pr(FP )

According to the equations (2.10) and (2.11), the equation (2.12) holds, which
means that the probability of power element failure (FP) is equal to the probability of
cyber element failure (Fc) plus the probability of power element failure (FP) without
cyber element failure (Fc). In other words, the state Фi with failure of Fc is mapped to
another state Фj with failure of FP.
Pr( FP )  Pr( FC )  Pr( FC'  FP )

2.3.2

(2.12)

Overview of Proposed Reliability Assessment Procedure
Figure 2.2 shows the flowchart of proposed solution procedure for evaluating the

impact of direct cyber-power interdependencies on the power system reliability. This
procedure has five major steps as follows:
Step 1: The probability table named P-Table is initialized.
Step 2: Equivalent states in the P-Table are merged together to build a reduced
P-Table.
Step 3: State mapping is implemented to map the failures in the cyber network to
the failures in the power network.
Step 4: Load shedding in the power system is performed for states having nonzero probability.
Step 5: Based on the load shedding values obtained, the reliability indices such as
LOLP and EENS are calculated.
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Figure 2.2

2.3.3

Flowchart of proposed reliability assessment procedure

Creating the P-Table
The algorithm to create the P-Table is presented in this section.

2.3.3.1

Initializing the P-Table
A cyber-power network with NC+NP elements has 2

( Nc N p )

possible states. In a

large network, evaluating all of these states is practically impossible. Realize that among
all possible states, a small group of states usually covers a large percentage of the
occurrence probability, and the probability of states decreases significantly with the
increase in the order of state. Therefore, the maximum order of states is used as the
termination condition when initializing P-Table.
P-Table is filled with state reproduction in that the most probable states are
generated and added to the P-Table as a stack. This procedure shown in Figure 2.3 has
three steps as follows:
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Step 1: The first Ф1 is added into the P-Table. This state represents the normal
state of cyber-power network in which the status of all elements is zero.
Step 2: For all NC+NP elements of Фi, if the status of its element φik is equal to
zero, the new state Ф'i will be generated by duplicating Фi and setting φ'ik
=1. If the obtained Ф'i does not exist in the current P-Table, it will be
added into the end of P-Table. In the loop for the state Фi with the order
E, (NC+NP –E) states with the order E+1 can be derived.

Start

i 1
Add Φ1
Order(Φi )  M

Yes

k 1

k  k 1

ik  0

No

i  i 1

End

Yes

No

Last k

Yes

k  k 1

Φ' i  Φi

 ik  1

pi 

N C N P



k 1

'

'

Ak (1ik )U k ik

If Φi' is not in P Table
Add Φi' to P Table

Figure 2.3

P-Table initialization procedure
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Step 3: After running Step 2 for all elements of the state Фi, move to the next
state Фi+1 in the current P-Table and repeat Step 2 until the order of states
exceeds the maximum order M.
As an example, Figure 2.4 shows a simple cyber-power network in which both
cyber and power networks consist of two nodes and a data connection/power line. The
arrow between C1 and P1 shows a CP-Link D= (C1:P1), which means that P1 would not
work properly if C1 fails or does not receive data from C2. Table 2.1 lists failure and
repair rates of each element in Figure 2.4.
Table 2.1
Network

Cyber

Power

Failure and Repair Rates of Cyber and Power Elements
Element

λ

µ

(Failure/Year)

(Occ/Year)

Function

C1

Controller

3

97

C2

Server

2

98

C3

Connection

3

97

P1

Generation

4

96

P2

Load

2

98

P3

Line

4

96

The normal state Ф1=(0,0,0,0,0,0) is set in the first step. Then, six possible states
are derived from Ф1 and added to the P-Table. Similarly, more possible states are derived
from the obtained six states as shown in Figure 2.5. Considering the maximum order of 3,
only 42 states among the total 26 states are shown in Figure 2.5 and corresponding
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probability are listed in Figure 2.6. For instance, the probability of state Ф11 (C1, P2), in
which the status of elements C1 and P2 are 1, is
Pr11  U c1  Ac 2  Ac3  A p1  U p 2  A p3 
0.03  0.97  0.98  0.96  0.04  0.98  0.001073

C3:Connection
C1:Controller

C2:Server

P3: Transmission Line
P1:Generation

P2:Load

Figure 2.4

An example of cyber-power network

Figure 2.5

State production for the cyber-power network in Figure 2.4
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(2.13)

Figure 2.6

2.3.3.2

P-Table creation for the cyber-power network in Figure 2.4: a) Initial PTable; b) Integration of equivalent states; c) State mapping

Integration of Equivalent States
Each network contains some states in which the network topology/evaluation

equations are identical. For example, when a node fails all connected elements virtually
and logically fail. Thus, it would be better to combine all these states as a unique state
which usually is the largest order equivalent state (LOES) and has the cumulative
probability of all equivalent states. For each state, the procedure shown in Figure 2.7 has
three main steps as follows:
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Step 1: Duplicate state Фi by using state Ф'i.
Step 2: For each element in state Ф'i, check if it is in-service and a connection. If
yes, check if either starting or ending nodes of this connection is out-ofservice. If yes, then the element status φ’ij is set to 1. Otherwise, go to the
next element.
Step 3: State Ф'i is the LOES of state Фi. If Ф'i does not exist in the current
P_Table, add new state Ф'i to the P_Table. Then, add the probability of
state Фi to the probability of state Ф'i and set the probability of state Фi to
zero.

Φ i'  Φ i

j 1

 ij  0
&

j  j 1

Connection

j NC NP

If Φ' i is not in P  Table
Add Φ' i to P  Table
PrΦ'i  PrΦ' i  PrΦi
PrΦi  0

i, N s  0

j  j 1

i , Ne  0

'ij  1

Figure 2.7

The procedure for integration of equivalent states
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For an example shown in Figure 2.4, the state Ф11 (C1, P2) has failures in two
nodes. Then, communication channel C3 and power line P3, which are linked to these
two nodes, respectively, will be logically considered as failed elements. Thus, the state
Ф11 (C1, P2) can be integrated into the state Ф45 (C1, C3, P2, P3). Similarly, Ф28 (C1, C3,
P2) and Ф32 (C1, P2, P3) are also integrated in Ф45 and the cumulative probability is
0.001115. As a result, the P-Table is further reduced by the integration of equivalent
states.
2.3.3.3

State Mapping
For each state, it needs to examine whether it can be mapped to another state

based on DEEI or DNEI.
2.3.3.3.1

State Mapping Procedure

A CP-Link D= (γ : δ) is used to determine direct cyber-power interdependencies.
If the failure of a cyber element γ causes the failure of a power element δ, set α=1 to
indicate a DEEI; if a cyber element γ can work but does not receive the required data
from data sources, and consequently causes the failure or mal-operation of a power
element δ, set β=1 to indicate a DNEI; otherwise, α=0 and β=0. Figure 2.8 shows the
state mapping procedure for the state Фi. The following three main steps are implemented
for all NW CP-Links:
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Φ  Φ

 1

 1

Φ  Φ  Dw
w  ND

Φ  Φ

Figure 2.8

State mapping procedure for direct interdependencies

Step1: If the cyber element γW of the CP-Link Dw fails in the state Фi, set αW =1;
otherwise, αW =0.
Step2: If αW =0, run the cyber network evaluation which is discussed in the next
Subsection C.3.2. If

the

cyber element γW in the CP-Link DW works in the

state Фi but cannot get required data from data sources, then DNEI exists
and βW =1; otherwise, βW =0.
Step3: If αW =1 or βW =1, then, the target state Ф'i for state mapping is updated as
Φi'  Φi'  Dw
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(2.14)

For the example shown Figure 2.4, the state Ф45 (C1, C3, P2, P3) will map to the
state Ф47 (C1, C3, P1, P2, P3) because the failure of C1 causes the failure P1 based on
the given CP-Link D=(C1: P1).
2.3.3.3.2

Connectivity Check of Cyber Networks with Multiple Data Sources

In order to recognize DNEI, the value of βw is required which can be determined
by performing the cyber network evaluation. In order to achieve correct communication,
data from multiple sources need to be transmitted [59]. The proposed network evaluation
in this section is based on receiving data from all required sources of data, named as
connectivity check with multiple data sources.
Using a loop or mesh topology, the network reliability would be enhanced due to
redundant paths to transfer data. However, the intended redundancy needs to be managed
in order to avoid Ethernet loops in which broadcast frames may circulate forever to lead
to reduced transmission bandwidth and increased network traffic. This is accomplished in
switches that implement the Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) as specified in IEEE
802.1D. This algorithm detects loops and blocks Ethernet frames from flooding the local
network by breaking the loops logically inside the switches [60]. RSTP creates a single
active path between any two nodes within a mesh network of Ethernet switches using the
spanning tree algorithm [61]. After the RSTP virtually and arbitrarily removes certain
branches to avoid loops in the cyber network, the following linear programming model
(2.14)-(2.18) is proposed to maximize the data connections.

Max

NB NR

  Rrb

b1 r 1

S.t.
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(2.15)

NJ

NS

NR

j1

s1

r 1

 ψ mj  T jb   ρmsb  S sb   ηmrb  Rrb

0  Rrb  1

b, m

b,r

S sb  0

b,s

   T jb  

b,j

(2.16)
(2.17)
(2.18)
(2.19)

where Rrb is the data received at the data receiver r for the type of data source b. Ssb is the
data supplied from data source s for the type of data source b. Tjb is the data transferred
through the available communication channel j for the type of data source b. ψmj is the
element of node-channel incidence matrix ψ in which ψmj=1 if the starting point of
available communication channel j is node m; ψmj=-1 if the ending point of available
channel j is node m; otherwise, ψmj=0. ρmsb is the element of node-source incidence
matrix ρ in which ρmsb=1 if the data source s for the type of data source b is at node m;
otherwise, ρmsb=0. ηmrb is the element of node-receiver incidence matrix η in which ηmrb
=1 if the data receiver r for the type of data source b is at the node m; otherwise, ηmrb =0.
From the optimization viewpoint, Rrb is either zero or one. Thus, βW is defined in
(2.19) to determine whether the available data receiver r=γW can successfully receive
required data from required data sources Nb. βW =1 means DNEI in which the required
data cannot be transferred to the data receiver r which consequently causes the failure of
power element δW.


1 if
βw  
0 if


NB

R

 Nb

R

 Nb

rb

b1
NB

b 1
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rb

(2.20)

2.3.4

Load Shedding Evaluation of Power Systems
For simplicity, a DC power flow model is used to minimize the load curtailment

(2.20) for each state with non-zero probability. Prevailing constraints need to be satisfied,
including the nodal power balance (2.21), line flow equation (2.22), generation limit
(2.23), load shedding limit (2.24), line capacity (2.25) and reference bus angle (2.26). To
achieve more precise results, it is not difficult to extend the proposed model to the AC
load flow based load shedding evaluation.

Min

ND

LC   LC d
T
i

(2.21)

d 1

S.t.
NL

NG

ND

ND

l 1

g 1

d 1

d 1

 κ ml  PLl   μmg  PG g   λmd  PDd   λmd  LC d
PLl 

θm  θn
xmn

m

l (m,n)

PG gmin  PG g  PG gmax

0  LCd  PDd
 PLmax
 PLl  PLmax
l
l

g

(2.22)

(2.23)
(2.24)

d

(2.25)

l

(2.26)

θ ref  0

(2.27)

where, d is the index of load and LCd is the load curtailment from the demand PDd. PGg
is the generation of generating unit g. PLl is the real power transferred through the
available power line l. θm is the phase angle at bus m. κml is the element of bus-line
incidence matrix κ in which κml =1 if the starting point of available power line l is bus m;
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κml =-1 if the ending point of available line l is bus m; otherwise, κml =0. μmg is the
element of bus-unit incidence matrix μ in which μmg =1 if the bus m is the generator bus;
otherwise, μmg =0. λmd is the element of bus-demand incidence matrix λ in which λmd =1 if
the bus m is the load bus; otherwise, λmd =0. LC iT is the total load curtailments in all
loads.
2.3.5

Reliability Indices Calculations
After getting the load shedding amount for all states listed in the final P-Table,

the LOLP and EENS are calculated as follows:
LOLP   PrΦi  sgn(LCiT )

(2.28)

EENS   Pr i  LCiT

(2.29)

i

i

where sgn stands for the sign function and it is one and zero when the input number is
positive and zero, respectively.
2.4

Case Studies
Microgrid, as an application of cyber-power system, is taking advantage of

information technology to control and operate small-scale power systems [62]. The
operation of microgrid firmly relies on computer network and information data flow
technologies [63]. Energy management units (EMU) are key devices in microgrids that
manage resources to balance generations and loads, in order to maintain the stability and
continuous operation of microgrids [64], [65]. In this section, the impact of failure in
EMUs on the reliability indices of a microgrid will be investigated. It is assumed that the
servers run the stability agorithm and transmit real-time decisions to the EMUs which are
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responsible for sending signals to breakers and sectionalizers to connect or disconnect the
coresponding bay from the main microgrid [66], [67]. Losing data related to a feeder
causes “Loss of Control” situation and interrupts the operation of corresponding feeder
[68], because the central decision maker neither knows how much energy is used by the
corresponding load, nor can manage the generating units to produce required power. In
other words, communication between each controller and servers is assumed as a
prerequisite condition for energizing a feeder.
2.4.1

Testing System Description
Figure 2.9 shows a single-line diagram of the power network in a microgrid. The

power network includes four distributed generation units and three loads. It has a radial
topology in which generators and loads are connected to cascaded busbars, B1, B2, B3
and B4. Figure 2.10 shows a schematic diagram of cyber control network in this
microgrid. The cyber control network is a bus topology LAN-Ethernet network which
includes EMUs, servers and switches. The capacity of generating units and load demands
are listed in Table 2.2. The capacity of all power lines is assumed to be 1.2 p.u.. For
simplicity, the availability of generation resources is assumed to be one. Table 2.3 lists all
CP-Links between individual EMU controllers and their corresponding power elements in
the microgrid. As failure and repair rates vary for different vendors and also depend on
ambient conditions, failure and repair rates of cyber and power elements are assumed and
listed in Table 2.4.
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2.4.2

Testing Results
In order to show the effectiveness of proposed reliability assessment method, the

following three cases are studied:
Case 1: Impact of the failure of cyber network on the power system reliability
Case 2: Sensitivity analysis of the failure rate of cyber elements on the reliability
of power system
Case 3: Impact of the cyber network configuration on the power system reliability

Figure 2.9

2.4.2.2

A schematic diagram of power network in a microgrid

Case 1
The reliability assessment is performed for the following five scenarios which are

summarized in Table 2.5:


Scenario 1: This scenario as a base case assumes that the cyber network is
failure



free, but elements in the power network could fail.

Scenario 2: In this scenario, the power network is failure free, but EMUs
in the cyber network might fail. The results of this scenario show the
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reliability degradation of the microgrid due to DEEI while the power
system is failure free.


Scenario 3: This scenario measures the impact of both DEEI and DNEI in
the entire cyber network on the failure-free power system. The difference
of the result of this scenario with that of scenario 2 emphasizes the
importance of DNEI which needs to examine the cyber network
connectivity.



Scenario 4: This scenario is the combination of scenarios 1 and 2 that
means the DEEI between EMU controllers and power elements is
considered while the power system is not failure free. The comparison
between the result of this scenario and those of scenarios 1 and 2 shows
the differences between the reliability of an individual power network and
that of a coupled cyber-power network while only DEEI is considered.

Figure 2.10

A schematic diagram of cyber network in a microgrid
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Scenario 5: This scenario evaluates the reliability of the power system
given that the effect of failures in the entire communication network and
all controllers. Also, in this scenario, the power system is not failure free.

Reliability results including LOLP and EENS of the microgrid are presented in
Table 2.6. Scenarios 2 and 4 only include DEEI, while scenarios 3 and 5 include both
DEEI and DNEI. According to the reliability indices summarized in Table 2.7, the DNEI
in the cyber network should be analyzed to achieve a more accurate evaluation.
Table 2.2

Generator and Load Data

Generator

Capacity (p.u)

Load

Demand (p.u.)

DG1

0.3

LOAD1

1.2

DG2

1

LOAD2

1

DG3

1

LOAD3

0.7

DG4

1

Table 2.3

CP-Links between Cyber and Power Networks
D1

(EMU1 : LOAD1)

D2

(EMU1 : DG1)

D3

(EMU2 : LOAD2)

D4

(EMU2 : DG2)

D5

(EMU3 : LOAD3)

D6

(EMU3 : DG3)

D7

(EMU4 : DG4)

52

Table 2.4

Table 2.5

Failure and Repair Rates for Cyber and Power Elements
Elements

λ (Failures/Year)

µ (Occ/Year)

EMU1, EMU2,EMU3, EMU4

0.1

73

SRV1, SRV2

0.1

73

SW1, SW2, SW3, SW4

0.3

73

B1, B2, B3, B4

0.6

365

Scenarios for Case 1

S.

Power Elements

Cyber Elements

1

B1, B2, B3, B4

-

2

-

EMU1, EMU2, EMU3, EMU4
EMU1, EMU2, EMU3, EMU4

SW1, SW2,SW3, SW4, SRV1, SRV2

3
4

B1, B2, B3, B4

5

B1, B2, B3, B4

EMU1, EMU2, EMU3, EMU4
EMU1, EMU2, EMU3, EMU4
SW1, SW2,SW3, SW4,SRV1, SRV2

Table 2.6

Reliability Results for Case 1
LOLP

EENS (p.u)

1. Failure in the power system

0.0065

0.0086

2. Failure in the controllers

0.0199

0.0468

3. Failure in the communication network

0.0358

0.0836

4. Failure in the controllers and power system

0.0252

0.0538

5. Failure in the communication network and power system

0.0534

0.1254

Scenarios
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2.4.2.3

Case 2
In order to further evaluate the sensitivity or importance of different cyber

elements on the power system reliability, the power network is assumed failure free and
Figure 2.11 shows the vulnerability of three groups of cyber elements as their failure
rates are linearly increasing by adjusting coefficient k. This figure apparently shows that
the microgrid reliability is more vulnerable to the failure rate of switches in the cyber
network. Also, the redundancy of servers decreases the dependency of power system to
the failure rate of servers. Note that the EENS has a similar pattern with the LOLP while
increasing the failure rate of cyber elements.

Figure 2.11

Sensitivity of the microgrid reliability with respect to different cyber
elements
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2.4.2.4

Case 3
This case assumes that the power network is failure free and studies the impact of

cyber network configuration on the power system reliability. For a same microgrid as
shown in Figure 2.9, four different cyber configurations are taken into account. The first
one shown in Figure 2.10 is a bus topology and has been studied in Case 1. Although the
bus topology deploys less network devices, every single failure can cause disconnection
in the cyber network. The second one shown in Figure 2.12 is ring topology which is able
to tolerate single failures inside the cyber network and transmit data through the
redundant path. In Figure 2.13, the third one is recommended which is similar to the
second one, but can use two independent controllers for each load and generation side.
The fourth one is redundant star topology in which all controllers are connected to a
single switch. As shown in Figure 2.14, all bay-level switches SW1- SW4 are connected
to redundant switches SW5 and SW6.
Table 2.7 concludes that the microgrid has different reliability values for various
cyber network configurations. The following observations are obtained:


Compared with the bus topology, the reliability indices in both ring
topologies increase as they have two redundant ways to transfer data
package to controllers. The bus topology as the simplest topology has
higher load interruption and Ring-1 has the lowest LOLP and EENS
among all configurations.



Although the redundant star has more switches and connections, both
LOLP and EENS are worse than those of Ring-1. It implies that a higher
cyber complexity with more switches does not necessarily guarantee a
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higher reliability. Thus, an optimization algorithm is needed to design a
proper cyber network which can maintain a higher level of reliability.
Although both Ring-1 and Ring-2 have similar network topology, LOLP and
EENS of Ring-1 are better than those of Ring-2. In the former, both loads and generating
units are controlled by a single EMU, while the later uses two independent EMUs for
loads and generating units respectively. It means that increasing the number of controllers

Figure 2.12

A schematic diagram of Ring-1
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Figure 2.13

A schematic diagram of Ring-2

Figure 2.14

The schematic diagram of redundant star
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Table 2.7

2.5

LOLP and EENS of Four Different Topologies
Topology

# of Switches

LOLP

EENS (p.u)

Bus Topology (Figure 2.10)

4

0.035844

0.083678

Ring -1 (Figure 2.12)

5

0.021643

0.01924

Ring -2 (Figure 2.13)

5

0.024318

0.020998

Redundant Star (Figure 2.14)

6

0.021659

0.019132

Conclusion
Nowadays, the efficient and reliable operation of power networks without cyber

networks is actually unattainable. In all smart grid initiatives, such as microgrids,
substation automation systems, advanced metering infrastructures (AMI), distributed grid
management, demand response and energy-efficiency building, the tight corporation
between cyber and power network exists.
This chapter quantitatively evaluates the reliability of a modern power system
while incorporating the impact of cyber network failures on the power network. The
proposed evaluation algorithm is applied for a typical microgrid to show the
effectiveness. Case studies consider both DEEI and DNEI. The results show that the
study on only DEEI is not adequate for assessing the reliability of a cyber-power system.
In addition, the design of the cyber network affects the reliability of the power network.
The proposed model is designed for direct interdependencies. Nevertheless, in
order to apply it to indirect interdependencies (IEEI, INEI), it is required to make changes
in some sub-routines of the algorithm. For example, since indirect interdependencies do
not impact the current operation of power network, the proposed mapping procedure is no
longer required. Meanwhile, because indirect interdependencies will impact the
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performance of power element against potential failures, both failure and repair rates of
power elements need to be updated.
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CHAPTER III
RELIABILITY MODELING AND EVALUATION OF POWER SYSTEM WITH
SMART MONITORING

3.1

Introduction
Smart grid initiatives and grid modernization efforts leverage the latest

advancements in digital communications and information technologies, offering
opportunities to enhance the power grid reliability, efficiency, and resiliency. The
traditional siloed monitoring and indication systems are being networked and enhanced to
achieve a more reliable and timely monitoring of the grid. Such smart grid monitoring
incorporates new ways to visualize power system status and health and to foresee
imminent failures [68].
With improvements in smart sensing and digital instrumentation technologies,
small and low-cost sensors have been fabricated for installation on the power network
[69]. Improvements in data storage technology save hundreds of gigabytes of data on
long-life, compact, and low-cost data storage devices. Contemporary technologies
provide ease of data backup, archival and retrieval layers of data stored over many years
make data management possible. Data mining and recognizing false data become
possible through analytical or well-developed rule-based algorithms. High-performance
CPUs execute more opcodes (operation codes) and operands (mathematical operations) at
a higher speed. Deploying user-friendly development tools and having access to
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previously-used hierarchical variables make it possible to build sophisticated logics.
Also, digital communication based on fiber optic cables or wireless connections empower
remote monitoring and visualization, which was formerly difficult to implement because
of the electromagnetic effects of high voltage on electrical signals (analog data) and
voltage drops in long copper cables carrying data.
Smart monitoring presents new, previously unattainable opportunities to
engineers. Wide-area monitoring is an advancement based on the new digital monitoring,
in which phasor measurement units (PMUs) are installed in the transmission sector.
Time-stamped angles and phasors of voltage and current are remotely transferred with
minimum latency along a wide-area network (WAN) to improve the situational
awareness of power systems, implement more precise state estimation algorithms, and
predict the system’s collapse [3], [70].
This chapter addresses the various aspects of reliability modeling and evaluation
in the context of smart grid monitoring. The chapter contributions are as follows:
A multiple-state Markov chain model is proposed for reliability modeling and
evaluation. In this model, the prevented and corrected states, and monitoring degree of
the power equipment with smart monitoring devices are defined.


A complete formulation is presented to quantify and demonstrate
component reliability improvement when monitored.



The impact of monitoring device failures is incorporated into the proposed
reliability assessment model.



Finally, a reduced model is proposed to facilitate the reliability evaluation.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2
describes the concept and applications of smart grid monitoring. Section
3.3 proposes the reliability modeling formulation. The case studies are
presented in Section 3.4. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section
3.5.

3.2

Smart Grid monitoring Applications
Smart monitoring represents the cooperation between analog/digital sensors,

measurement units, control devices, and protective relays inside a digital communication
network for the purpose of gathering local information from the power grid, registering
the servers and demonstrating the human machine interface (HMI). Power system
monitoring in general involves collecting and reporting various operational (e.g. RMS
voltages and currents) and non-operational (e.g. sampled values) data to the network
control center or station computer. The data may include Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) type measurements such as breaker statuses, current, voltage,
power and frequency measurements and condition data of a component [71]. Smart grid
monitoring encompasses online visualization, data collection and manipulation, and
indication.
3.2.1

Online Visualization
An important aspect of smart grid monitoring is to provide a consistent

visualization of the grid conditions and health status including system topology, states of
critical equipment, bus voltages, and active/reactive powers through the lines [69].
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In visualization, online data gathered from the power system are graphically
displayed on the HMI. The display includes the power system’s topology, states of power
equipment, the buses’ voltage labels, and the active and reactive power flowing through
the lines [68]. The single line diagram of each section of the power system, e.g., bays,
feeders, busbars, and high-voltage equipment, can be displayed in the following five
possible states:


Closed circuit energized: The section is powered and current flows.



Open circuit energized: The section is connected to the energized section,
but the breaker is open, and current does not flow through the section.



Isolated: The section is disconnected from energized sections. However,
because the power equipment may retain static charges, it is still not safe
for maintenance purposes.



Grounded: The earth switch of the section is closed, and it is safe for
maintenance.



Unknown: There is no valid data for a section, or some discrepancy exists
among the statuses and measured values.

Figure 3.1 shows the visualization of a high-voltage substation with ring
topology, including four incoming overhead lines (OHL) and two decreasing threewinding transformers.
Effective online visualization enhances situational awareness i.e. the ability to be
aware of grid conditions at all times and significantly reduces the operators workload
allowing them to focus on tasks that require operator attention leading to better decisions
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in the least possible amount of time [24]. Online visualization furthermore helps to
abstract a large amount of online information [72].

Figure 3.1

3.2.2

Network visualization of a ring-topology substation

Data Collection and Manipulation
Data collection and manipulation enables observability of the grid. Data

manipulation and querying about recorded data offers broad historical information about
the power network. Management and exploration of the recorded events and
measurements provide useful information about the operation of the power system,
including the existing correlations among events in different times and places. Analytical
and/or rule-based algorithms can further utilize this assortment of raw data to empower
the system operator to develop remedial strategies and troubleshoot existing failures. Bar
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charts, trends, animated flow, contour maps, and pie charts are examples of available
methods for demonstrating the results of data collection and manipulation [73].
The other application of data manipulation is to realize any correlation between
events and forthcoming consequences. Data manipulation expedites the fault diagnosis
process and reduces repair times, consequently increasing the system’s reliability. To
analyze a fault, knowing the sequential events that took place before the fault occurred is
crucial. This need is addressed by the timestamp included for each event or piece of
measured data. For example, the recurrence of a specific type of mal-operation inside the
protection network can be diagnosed by examining the recorded data to determine which
new setting dismissed the protection coordination. Figure3.2 schematically demonstrates
how data manipulation generates assorted queries.

Figure 3.2

Data manipulation for generating assorted queries

As an example, maintenance of circuit breakers and disconnect switches is
typically scheduled based on the number of open and close operations. The ability to
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extract the number of operations and impact of each operation can be provided from the
data captured over months and years. This type of data-driven maintenance can replace or
augment conventional periodic maintenance strategies, thereby increasing the reliability
of the grid [7].
3.2.3

Indication
While the data collection aspects involve all of the grid events, the indication

tasks are only dedicated to a subset of events that help detect or anticipate faults. Based
on the nature of the event, indications are categorized into physical and operational
indications. Physical indications are for a physical failure or problem in the power system
using sensors installed inside or near the critical equipment. Ignoring a physical
indication may lead to a dreadful failure in that equipment. Some high-voltage pieces of
equipment whose physical indications are precursors to faults are listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1

Some Physical Indicators Inside the Substation

Equipment
Power transformers
OLTC
Circuit breakers
Disconnect switches
Bushings
Surge arrestors
Standoff insulators
Batteries
Control cabinets

Indication
Oil levels, oil temperature, windings temperature, pump
Oil levels, spring, bearings, shafts, transition resistor
SF6 or Oil level, motor , trip & close coils
Motor, open & close coils
Oil levels and bad connections
Degradation of metal oxide disks
Moisture, contamination, degradation
Electrolyte leakage, electrolyte level, electrolyte temperature
Fans, door, pumps and other elements
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Operational indications are on the other hand for events that require special
attention during the operation. For example, tap-in-progress is an important operational
indication for a power transformer. The indicator blinks while the tap changes in response
to an automatic or manual command. During the tap-in-progress operation which usually
lasts about 10-20 seconds, the transformer and the power system experience a transient
situation, and any other switching in the network, such as open/close breakers, may
increase the instability of the power network [74].
3.3

Reliability Modeling of Smart Grid Monitoring
In this section, a mathematical model is presented to study the impact of smart

grid monitoring on power system reliability.
3.3.1

Augmented Component Reliability Modeling
Smart grid monitoring impacts preventive and corrective measures to maintain

grid reliability. Monitoring preventive actions can prevent the grid from experiencing
dreadful failures by derating or de-energizing stressed power equipment in-time through
a diverse array of predefined remedial actions. Derating a component creates a new up
(Up) state, and de-energizing it creates a new down (Dn) state with a shorter repair time
(or an improved repair rate). For instances:


Operators perform rescheduling, reconfiguration, and/or load-shedding
procedures to alleviate stress on a transformer whose indicators warn of a
problem creating a new Up state [9].



Indicators continuously monitor critical apparatus for incipient failures or
emergency situations and provide the most up-to-date condition
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information to the operators. Certain physical indications may lead the
operator to remove a piece of equipment from service temporarily creating
a new Dn state. In most cases, on-site maintenance readies the equipment
for use again.
Monitoring corrective actions allow operators to observe failures more easily and
quickly. Such actions significantly reduce the repair time, thereby increasing the repair
rate, and create a new Dn state.


As an application of online visualization, when a failure or fault deenergizes a part of the power network, operators are able to recognize
faulty sections in time and therefore minimize repair time and increase
repair rates [75].



Another example for online visualization is a fault clearing sequence,
which includes identifying fault occurrences, initiating relays, transmitting
relay blocking/tripping signals in a communication scheme, and opening
corresponding circuit breakers, can be traced with greater precision. Such
data provide information about the specific type of fault occurred in the
power system and also save operators a significant amount of time to
perform remedial actions to clear the fault [76].



Data collection and manipulation are applied to convey a clear view of the
grid to the system operator, allowing a better understanding of the grid
status [24].



Figure 3.3 illustrates how smart grid monitoring assists in enhancing the
reliability of an individual component by either increasing the repair rate μ
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or decreasing the failure rate λ. Three distinct modes are recognized as
below:


A preventive action creates a prevented Up state with a lower failure rate.



A preventive action creates a prevented Dn state with a shorter repair time
which means a higher repair rate.



A corrective action creates a corrected Dn state with a shorter repair time
which means a higher repair rate.

Figure 3.3

3.3.1.2

Reliability enhancement of an individual power element by smart
monitoring system

Monitoring Degree
Smart grid monitoring enhances equipment maintenance where certain

maintenance work is performed in anticipation for a failure. Such work creates a new Up
and Dn state corresponding to type of action taken. The degree with which the number of
states is increased is termed the monitoring degree. In other words, the monitoring degree
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is defined as the total number of all new Up and Dn states created by smart grid
monitoring.
3.3.1.3

Multiple-State Markov Chain Model
Without monitoring, a power apparatus is assumed to have two operational states:

up and down. Thus, the monitoring degree is zero. Figure 3.4.a shows the Markov chain
of the two-state reliability model. The component availability, PUpb , is equal to

PUpb 

b

b  b

(3.1)

where λb and µb are the failure rate and repair rate of the power component, respectively.
A multiple-state Markov chain of a component with smart monitoring is shown in
Figure 3.4.b. The Dnb in Figure 3.4.a is subdivided into Dn0-DnN and Up1-UpM.
Therefore, the monitoring degree is N+M. Dn0 is assumed to be an unpredictable down
state when the monitoring system cannot distinguish the failure or help fix the faulty
apparatus or section. Dn1 to DnN are new prevented and corrected down states, and Up1 to
UpM are the new prevented up states whose failures are predicted, allowing operators or
other automatic operations to maintain power by taking preventive actions.
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Figure 3.4

Markov chain for a power component (a) without and (b) with monitoring

In order to calculate the availability of an individual component, the following
derivations are conducted. The repair rates µ1-µN of Dn1 to DnN are greater than µ0 (or µb)
because, in the case of preventive and corrective actions, the repair time of new states are
less than the original repair time.

b  i

1 i  N

(3.2)

The failure rate of the apparatus without monitoring (λb) is equal to its total
departing transition rates with monitoring (λ0 to λM+N).

b 

N M


i 0

i

(3.3)

where i is the failure rate of the state i, which, in the Markov chain, is also called the
departing transition rate.
Given that the impact of unpredicted apparatus failures are equal to that of
failures without monitoring, the repair rate of Dn0 (µ0) is equal to the repair rate of the
apparatus without monitoring, µb,
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0  b

(3.4)

The balance equations for all nodes in the multiple-state Markov chain are listed in (3.5)
and (3.6).

i  PUp   i  PDn
0

0i N

i

 N i  PUp   N i  PUp
0

i

1 i  M

(3.5)
(3.6)

where  i is the repair rate of the state i, which, in the Markov chain, is also called the
arriving transition rate. PUpi and PDni are the probabilities of the Up and Dn states,
respectively.
Equation (3.7) requires that the total probability of all states is equal to one.
M

N

i 0

i 0

 PUpi   PDni  1

(3.7)

After substituting (3.5) and (3.6) in (3.7), PUp0 is found as

PUp0 

1
1

N M


i0

i
i

(3.8)

According to (3.6) and (3.8), we have

PUpi 

N i
 N i
1

N M


i0

i
i

1  i  M

Therefore, the total probability of all Up states equals
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(3.9)

N i
i 1  N  i
PUp   PUp 
N M

i 0
1  i
i 0  i
M

1 

M

i

(3.10)

Equation (3.11) shows that the availability PUp of an apparatus with monitoring
will increase as compared to the availability PUp without monitoring.
b

N i
1
i1  N i
PUp 

N M
N M


1  i
1  i
i0  i
i0  i
M

1 

1


1

N M


i0

i
b



1


1 b
b

(3.11)

 PUpb

States that continue to interrupt the operation of the apparatus are lumped into the
equivalent failure rate MI which is equal to
N

MI   i

(3.12)

i 0

Similar to (3.1), the general equation for the availability of an equivalent two-state
apparatus is

PUp 

 MI
MI   MI

(3.13)

So, the equivalent repair rate MI is calculated as

 MI 

MI  PUP
1 PUP

In this chapter, the failure rate decrement (FRD) is defined as
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(3.14)

 

MI
b

(3.15)

and the repair rate increment (RRI) is defined as

 

3.3.2

 MI
b

(3.16)

Impact of Monitoring Failure
The advantages associated with smart monitoring are achievable as long as the

monitoring system itself is reliable. However, failures in the monitoring system are
inevitable. For instance,


A failure of the indication device or an incorrect indication may have a
significant impact on the life of a transformer and may affect its reliability,
especially if it has to be operated under overloaded conditions [9].



If the control center is not alerted in a timely manner regarding a failure,
preventing further damage to grid reliability will be difficult.



If a group of events is not reported or archived in servers, data
manipulation will lead to incorrect query results.

In order to account for these example scenarios, the impact of monitoring system
failures should be incorporated in the reliability modeling as discussed next.
3.3.2.1

Integrating Monitoring System Failures into the Multiple-State Markov
Chain
When the monitoring system fails, the apparatus failures cannot be observed and

will be neglected. So, if the availability of the monitoring system equals AC, the failure
rate of the apparatus is
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'i  AC i  i

1 i  N  M

(3.17)

Note that the failures that could not be recognized by the monitoring system remain on
the state of Dn0 and the corresponding failure rate '0 is calculated as

'0  b 

N M


i 1

(3.18)

'
i

It is noted that '0 is greater than λ0 because some failures can not be detected due to the
failure of the monitoring system. The Markov chain of the apparatus considering the
failure of the monitoring system is similar to that of Figure 3.2. The only difference is in
the 'i for the failure/arrival rate, instead of i . Accordingly, (3.10) and (3.12) are
respectively updated as

'N i
i1  N i
PUp 
N M
i'
1 
i0  i

M

M

1 

1 


1

b 

i1
N M

A
i1

Ci

AC N  i   N i

 N i
 i

b

N

N

i0

i0

 MI   'i   AC i   i

3.3.2.2



(3.19)
N M


i1

ACi  i

i
(3.20)

Reduced Component Reliability Model
If the probability of experiencing monitoring failures in different monitoring

degrees is assumed to be equal to an average value of AC , (3.19) and (3.20) are changed
into
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M

1 AC  

PUp 

i1

b  AC 
1

b

 N i
 N i

M



N M


i1

i

 AC 

N M


i1

i
i

1 AC  


1 b  AC 
b

i1

N M


i1

 N i
 N i

N M
i

 AC   i
b
i1  i

N

 MI  AC    i

(3.21)

(3.22)

i0

The proposed (3.21) is based on the multiple-state Markov chain model in Figure
3.2.b. It demonstrates the overall reliability improvement of an apparatus when the
reliability of the monitoring system is taken into account. Notice that the practical
drawback of this equation is that it relies on certain detailed information which is not
always available or measurable. For example, it is difficult to determine the monitoring
degree i.e. the number of Up and/or Dn states, the percentage of failures eliminated due
to the integration of an individual monitoring device, and repair times required to return
to the primary state. Fortunately, it is possible to obtain the failure and repair rates of an
apparatus without and with monitoring using statistical techniques. To convert the
theoretical model to a practical one, it is desired to reduce (3.21) by representing it only
with four available parameters (λb, µb , λMI, µMI).
Since AC+UC=1, (3.21) is rewritten as
1

U C
N M
N M

b
i
i
 1
 AC  
 AC  
b

i1  b
i1  i

M

PUp  
1   N i

i1  N i
 AC

N M
N M



b
i
i
 1
 AC  
 AC  

b
i1  b
i1  i

To further reduce (3.23), the following lemma is applied.
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(3.23)

3.3.2.2.1

Lemma

If a and b are non-negative variables, and both |k| and a are less than b, the
difference between

3.3.2.2.2

b k a
ak
a
and
is less than
.
bk
b
bk

Proof

Since

ak
a
k
is
 1 , the difference between and
b
bk
b

d

(b  a)  k
ba b k a


b  (b  k) b  k
bk

The first term in (3.23) can be written as

b1  1 

(3.24)

a1
U c where a1 1 and
b1

N M
N M
N M  N M  
b


 AC   i  AC   i . Set k1  AC    i   i  . According to
b
i 1  b
i 1  i
 i 1  b i 1  i 

(3.3),
N M
N M
b


 AC   i  AC   i
b
i1  b
i1  i
N M
 N M 

 1 b   i  AC   i
 b i1  b
i1  i
N M


 1 0  AC   i  1
b
i1  b

b1  1

Also, in general, b   b and b   i , we get

N M


i 1

Thus,
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(3.25)

i
 1 and
b

N M

i


i 1

i

 1.

k1  AC 

N M


i 1

i N  M  i

1
 b i 1  i

(3.26)

Because both k1 and a1 are less than b1 , the Lemma can be used to approximate the first
term in (3.23) as

a1  k1
1 k1
U C 
U C
b
b1  k1
1

(3.27)

b

The corresponding error is less than

b
b  k a
b
 1  1 1 1 U C 
U C
b
b1  k1
1
b

(3.28)

Similarly, for the second term in (3.23), we define a2=1,
b2  1 

N M
N M
 N M  N M  
b


 AC   i  AC   i and k 2  U C    i   i   0 . And, we get
b
i 1  b
i 1  i
 i 1  i i 1  b 

b2  k 2  1

N M
i1

 1

N M

N M


i1

 1

N M


i1



i

i


i1

 1

i



i



b N M i

 b i1  b
1

b

N M

N M

i0

i1

 (  i 

 )
i

N M
N M
i 1

 (  i    i )
i b
i0
i1
N M
i  0


 1  i
i b
i0  i

Because b2  b1 1 and
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(3.29)

k2  U C 

N M


i1

i N M i

 1 , we can use the Lemma and (3.10) and (3.13) to
 b i1  i

approximate the second term of (3.23) into

 N i
)
 N i

M


a2  k 2
 (1  N i ) AC 
b2  k 2
i1  N i
M

(1 k 2 )  (1 
i1

1

N M


i0



1 k 2


1 MI
 MI

i
i

 AC

 AC

(3.30)

The corresponding error is

2 

b2  k 2  a 2
b2  k 2

M

 (1 
i1

 N i
) AC
 N i

 N M  N M  
b
 ( AC  U C )    i   i 

i 1  b 
 i 1  i
 b
 AC
MI
1
 MI

(3.31)

Notice that λb is considerably smaller than µb, (similarly, λMI is considerably smaller than
µMI), the approximation errors 1 (3.28) and  2 (3.30) are negligible.
According to the above discussion, (3.23) is approximated by

PUp 

1 k1


1 b
b

U C 

Since k1 U C  k 2  AC  K , then
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1 k 2


1 MI
 MI

 AC

(3.32)

UC  K

AC  K

UC

AC



(3.33)

 N M  N M  
b MI

)  AC U C    i   i 
  MI
i1  b 
 i1  i
 b


(1 b )  (1 MI )
b
 MI

(3.34)

PUp 


1 b
b




1 MI
 MI




1 b
b




1 MI
 MI

where δ is defined as
K



1

b
b

K


1

 MI
 MI

(

Similarly, as λb is considerably smaller than µb, and λMI is considerably smaller
than µMI, the  in (3.33) is negligible. Therefore, the availability of the power apparatus
considering the failure of the monitoring system can be further reduced to

PUp 

b

 b  b

UC 

 MI
AC
 MI   MI

(3.35)

which means that the availability of the power apparatus considering the failure of
the monitoring system can be approximately represented by conditional probability for
two independent components [21]. From (3.34), if the monitoring system was completely
available (AC=1), then PUp 

 MI
; otherwise, if the monitoring system is totally
 MI   MI

unavailable (AC=0), the Pup 

b

b   b

, which is equal to the availability of the apparatus

without any monitoring device. In addition, (3.34) exhibits a linear relationship between
the availability of the power apparatus (PUp) and that of the monitoring system (AC).
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3.4

Case Studies

This section investigates reliability of a power substation with integrated smart
monitoring devices. In order to calculate and compare the reliability of this substation
with and without monitoring, a well-known model which minimizes the load shedding
while considering network constraints is used. Both the Loss-of-Load-Expectation
(LOLE) and Expected-Energy-Not-Served (EENS) are measured.
Figure 3.5 shows the layout of the 400/63 kV substation with a breaker-and-a-half
configuration, in which three breakers are dedicated to two adjacent 400 kV lines. At the
63 kV level, for each outgoing feeder, one breaker is considered. Table 3.2 describes the
elements of the substation. Protection, control, and monitoring devices are installed in
this substation, and all measurements, events and disturbances are transferred to bay
control units and bay protection units which then transmit all collected data through the
digital communication network to servers S1 and S2. The communication network is a
star-wired and ring topology, in which a backbone-loop connects all switches.
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Figure 3.5

High voltage substation layout equipped with digital instruments

It is assumed that only breakers and transformers have non-zero failure rates. For
both transformers and circuit breakers, monitoring devices yield two considerable
outcomes including 1) Detecting imminent faults before catastrophic failures and longterm outages 2) Migrating from periodic maintenance to condition-based maintenance.
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Table 3.2

Elements of the substation
Elements
C01-A, C02-A

Breakers of Upper Cut-off, 400 kV, 500 MVA

C01-B, C02-B

Breakers of Middle Cut-off, 400 kV, 500 MVA

C01-C, C02-C

Breakers of Lower Cut-off, 400 kV, 500 MVA

C01-T, C02-T

Power Transformers, 400/63 kV feeder

F10, F20
F11,F12, F13, F21, F22, F23

3.4.2

Description

Breakers of 63 kV Outgoing feeders
Breakers of 63 kV Outgoing feeders, 167 MVA

Transformer Reliability Data and Assumptions

Power transformers are expensive pieces of equipment in power substations
subject to component failures. Table 3.3 lists the failure distribution in different parts of a
power transformer. In this case study, it is assumed that the health status of On-LoadTap-Changer (OLTC), oil and windings are being monitored. OLTCs have the highest
failure rates. The probability of mechanical failures (for example failures in springs,
bearings, shafts, drive mechanisms) is higher than electrical faults, such as coking of
contact, burning of transition resistors, and insulation problems [77]. OLTC monitoring
has various components, including torque of the motor drive, switching supervision,
temperature of the diverter switch oil, and a contact wear model when combined with
supervision of load current. Several online monitoring systems for OLTC currently exists
[7]. The other dominant failures are collected on windings and cooling oil. The maximum
loading is limited by the operating temperature of the transformer. If the transformer is
operated in high temperatures, the insulation will be worn out earlier than expected [78],
[79].
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Table 3.3

Typical failure distribution for substation transformers with OLTCs
Failure rates

Table 3.4

OLTC

41%

Winding and Oil

32%

Accessories

12%

Terminals

12%

Core

3%

Failure and Repair Rates for Transformer
Repair rates
States

Failure rates (occ/yr)
(occ/yr)

Dnb

λb

0.1

µb

73

Dn0

λ0

0.027

µ0

73

Dn1

λ1

0.041

µ1

730

Up1

λ2

0.032

µ2

730

Figure 4.6 shows a Markov model with two monitoring degrees. The first degree
(Dn1) is related to the failure of OLTC, and the second one (Up1) is related to overheating
caused primarily by an overload; thus, it can be controlled by decreasing the load. Table
3.3 lists the transition rates among various states of Figure 3.4.a. The total failure rate is
arbitrarily assumed to be 0.1 occ/yr, and λ0, λ1, and λ2 are assumed based on the failure
percentage listed in Table 3.2. For the forced outage (Dn0), 5 days of maintenance is
optimistically considered, while 12 hours of maintenance is considered for the prevented
outage (Dn1) and derated mode (Up1).
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Figure 3.6

Table 3.5

Markov chain model for a) substation transformer b) circuit breaker

Failure rates and Repair Rates for Circuit Breakers
Failure rates
Repair rates (occ/yr)

States
(occ/yr)

3.4.3

Dnb

λb

0.0542

µb

73

Dn0

λ0

0.0067

µ0

73

Dn1

λ1

0.0475

µ1

730

Circuit Breaker Reliability Data and Assumptions

Circuit breakers require monitoring to ensure a reliable operation. Reference [80]
reported that the SF6 circuit breaker has an average failure rate of 0.0542 occ/yr. After
implementing physical and condition monitoring functions, about 87.6% of failures can
be predicted. A Markov chain with one monitoring degree is proposed in Figure 3.4.b.
Table 3.5 lists the corresponding transition rates. b is assumed as the total failure rate,

0 is the part which cannot be recognized by the monitoring system, and 0 is the
remaining part that continues to cause forced outages.
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3.4.4

Case Studies

Three cases are introduced to demonstrate the application of the proposed
reliability modeling.
3.4.4.1

Case 1

Substation reliability improvement by monitoring devices:
In this case, the failures associated with the monitoring devices are neglected. Based on
(3.8) and (3.9), the probabilities of the transformers being in Up states are calculated as

PUP0 

PUP1 

1
 0.9995
0.027 0.073
1

73
730

(3.36)

0.032
 PUP0  4.381 10 5
730

(3.37)

Therefore, the total probability of all Up states equals
PUP  PUP0  PUP1  0.9996

(3.38)

The equivalent failure and repair rates with monitoring are calculated as

MI  0  1  0.068
 MI 

 MI  PUP
1 PUP



0.068 0.9995
 135.9
1 0.9995

(3.39)

(3.40)

Thus, the FRD and RRI are found as

 

MI

 0.68
   MI  1.86
b
b
and
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(3.41)

Likewise, for circuit breakers, κλ and κµ are equal to 0.123 and 0.57, respectively.
The LOLE and EENS with and without monitoring are given in Table 3.5. The results
indicate that the monitoring system decreases the LOLE and EENS of the substation by
about 59% and 53%, respectively.
Table 3.6

LOLE and EENS of the substation
Without

With

Improvement

Monitoring

Monitoring

(%)

LOLE (hr/Year)

21.422

8.591

59.22 %

EENS (%)

0.096

0.0444

53.75 %

Indices

3.4.4.2

Case 2

Reliability improvement based on increasing the Monitoring degree
Equations (3.2)-(3.16) indicate that the improvement of smart monitoring
enhances power system reliability. However, the question remains as to how much
improvement is necessary to effectively enhance reliability. The calculation is performed
from zero to nine degrees. After increasing the degree, the corresponding Markov chain
is redrawn, and equations (3.2)-(3.16) are solved. The improvement of smart monitoring
is modeled with increments of the monitoring degree, assuming that the first degree
increases with an Up state, and the other degrees are Dn states. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show
the decrement of LOLE and EENS when the monitoring degree increases. Major changes
occur when the monitoring degree increases to 2. However, increasing the monitoring
degree even more does not efficiently decrease the LOLE and EENS.
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Figure 3.7

LOLE decreases as monitoring degree increases

Figure 3.8

EENS decreases as monitoring degree increases

3.4.4.3

Case 3
Impact of the monitoring system failure on substation reliability improvement:
To evaluate this impact, the availability (AC) of the monitoring devices is

gradually varied from zero to one and the reliability of the substation is calculated. Figure
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3.9 shows that the EENS and LOLE decrease as the availability of the monitoring devices
increases.
In order to assess the accuracy of the reduced expression for overall reliability
improvement in (3.21), the reliability indices LOLE and EENS were calculated from
which the approximation error given in Figure 3.10 were obtained. The figure illustrates
that as the availability of the monitoring devices gradually increases from zero to one, the
approximation error gradually increases peaking at 0.5 and falling off afterwards. Note
that the peak approximation error (0.15%) is still acceptable when Ac=0.5. Therefore, it is
established that (3.34) is an acceptable approximation for (3.21).

Figure 3.9

EENS and LOLE v.s. the availability of monitoring devices
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Figure 3.10

3.5

Approximation error v.s. the availability of monitoring devices

Conclusions
The proliferation of low-cost sensors and instrumentation throughout the power

systems as well as adjacent technology advancements provide new opportunities for
advanced smart grid monitoring.
In this chapter, certain promising aspects of smart grid monitoring were
introduced. A multiple-state Markov chain model was proposed to model inclusion of
smart monitoring devices in the power system reliability. The proposed model quantifies
power component reliability improvement when monitored. The impact of monitoring
device failures is taken into account in the proposed reliability assessment model. To
better fit the practical applications, a simplified reliability evaluation model was also
presented in the chapter.
The modeling and advantages of smart grid monitoring for reliability
enhancement were demonstrated through a few case studies applied to a power
substation. The proposed model can be applied for trade-off studies comparing the
monitoring costs with respect to reliability enhancements. Moreover, the proposed model
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can be utilized in an optimization framework to determine the optimum monitoring points
considering reliability and cost constraints.
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CHAPTER IV
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF SMART GRID CONSIDERING INDIRECT
CYBER-POWER INTERDEPENDENCIES

4.1

Introduction

Smart grid technologies facilitate the deployment of automation and data
communication through smart devices and communication networks on the bulk power
system. The main purpose is to efficiently operate the power system, optimize energy
management, and maintain bulk power system reliability. The modern smart grid is a
cyber-power network consisting of two distinguishable networks - cyber and power. Each
network has its own standards and protocols and is governed by physical and logical laws
belonging exclusively to that network [15].
When the employment of cyber networks in various power applications increases,
the failures of smart devices and their impact on the power system are highlighted and
become a serious concern [73]. Reports of blackouts affirm that mal-operation and
deficiency in cyber network applications, e.g., control, monitoring, and protection, are
contributing factors to the degradation of the power grid’s reliability and stability, which
ultimately may cause massive outages [19].
Interdependency generally means that the correct and appropriate operation of one
element depends on the existence and proper function of some other elements [81]. A
failure in the cyber network may affect the power network in various ways [22].
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Interdependencies are defined as either direct or indirect based on how a cyber failure
impacts the power system [82].
Direct interdependency refers to the situation in which a failure in the cyber
network causes an element in the power network to operate incorrectly or to stop
operating completely. Reference [83] introduced the concept of direct interdependencies
and then studied two types of direct interdependencies between cyber and power
networks. The first type, Direct Element-Element Interdependencies (DEEI), is always
found in points that interconnect the cyber and power networks. The second type, Direct
Network-Element Interdependencies (DNEI), occur when failures inside the
communication network change the specifications of the elements in the power network.
The state mapping method is described in [83] to evaluate the reliability of the cyberpower network considering direct interdependencies.
However, the impact of indirect interdependencies on the reliability of power
system is different and more complicated than that of direct interdependencies. Indirect
interdependency means that failures of a group of elements in one network do not directly
and immediately cause the failure of or change the behavior of the element in the other
network, but the failure will impact the performance of that element against future
failures. According to this definition, both hidden and unacknowledged failures are
categorized as indirect interdependencies.
Monitoring and protection are two major applications of indirect
interdependencies in power systems. Failures in monitoring system do not stop operation
of power system, but result that impending failures remain unrevealed. References [9],
[84] investigated the impact of failures in monitoring devices on the operation of power
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systems and reported that the failure of the indicator or an incorrect indication may
undesirably impact the reliability of the power equipment. Another application of indirect
interdependencies is protection. Failures in protection system are categorized as hidden
failures, as they remain unrevealed until another failure in the power system takes place
[85], [86]. Mal-operation of protection devices, when needed, causes the expansion of deenergized region.
This chapter proposes a reliability assessment algorithm to model indirect
interdependencies between cyber and power networks. The concept and formulations of
state updating are proposed to update the probability of states due to failures in the cyber
network. With the state updating, running two interconnected and heterogeneous
networks becomes possible. An algorithm is developed to evaluate the impact of indirect
cyber-power interdependencies on the reliability indices, such as the loss of load
probability (LOLP) and expected energy not served (EENS).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 defines basic
concepts regarding indirect interdependencies. Section 4.3 discusses the reliability
evaluation of cyber-power networks considering the indirect interdependencies. In
Section 4.4, a high-voltage substation is studied to justify the effectiveness of the
proposed algorithm. Finally, the conclusion drawn from discussions appears in Section
4.5.
4.2

Indirect Interdependencies inside a Cyber-Power Network

Different from direct interdependency which means that cyber failures cause the
power devices stop working or to operate incorrectly, indirect interdependency occurs
when the failure of one cyber element does not directly impact the correct operation of
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the power element. This section discusses the definition and applications of indirect
interdependencies as well as the indirect cyber-power links.
4.2.1

Definition of Indirect Interdependencies

Given indirect interaction, a cyber failure will not stop the operation or change the
behavior of the power element immediately but will impact the performance of the power
element against the potential failure. Such interdependency may either increase the
possibility of new failures of the power element or defer the response to the current
failure of the element. Thus, indirect interdependency is modeled as the increment in
failure rate and the decrement in repair rate of the power device. In terms of the nature of
cyber-power networks and the location of failure, two types of indirect interdependencies
are defined as below.
Type 1: Indirect Element-Element Interdependencies (IEEI) exist when failures
occur on cyber devices that are physically/logically connected to an
element in the power system.
Type 2: Indirect Network-Element Interdependencies (INEI) exist when the
failure does not occur on any cyber devices that are directly connected to
the power network, but rather, it occurs inside the cyber network, which
will impact the performance of the power element against the future
failure.
4.2.2

Indirect Interdependencies in Power System Applications

In this section, two applications of indirect interdependencies are introduced:
monitoring and protection.
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4.2.2.1

Monitoring Systems

Power system monitoring system deals with gathering and reporting different
types of data to the local and remote power system control centers. The monitoring
systems provide opportunities to predict, perceive, and take prompt actions against
sustained and/or imminent failures, resulting in a significant reduction of failure rates and
repair times [84].
A monitoring system generally consists of online visualization, data manipulation,
and indication [87]. Online visualization provides a consistent vision of the grid
conditions and health status, including system topology, critical equipment statuses, and
bus voltages [69]. Data manipulation is the other application of monitoring that enables
the monitored system to be observed. Data manipulation and querying the recorded data
provide broad chronological data about the power network. Indication tasks refer to a
subset of actions that facilitate the anticipation or detection of faults within an acceptable
time span and thereafter prevent those failures. Erroneous, incomplete, or invalid
measurements and indications may ultimately cause severe consequences. For example,
power transformers are specifically critical to this mission. Any minor failure, such as a
fluid leak or gradual degradation of internal insulation in a transformer, may reduce its
effective life and threaten safe and reliable grid operation [9].
The monitoring system is an application of indirect interdependencies. Although
not interrupting the operation of the corresponding power device immediately, the failure
of the monitoring system may cause unacknowledged events and substantially increase
the risk of failure in the power system. For example, if any indicators fail, it causes IEEI,
however if the failure is inside the communication network, it is INEI.
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4.2.2.2

Protection Systems

Faults in the power system represent non-favorable conditions that occur because
of either equipment failures or natural disasters, such as lightning. It is critical that any
system faults can be detected and cleared, and/or other mitigating actions can be taken
promptly. Protection systems generally consist of processor-embedded protective relays
and data communication networks necessary for the dependable operation of protective
functions [88].
Failures in most parts of the protection system remain unrevealed until system
disturbances occur, such as short circuit faults or overloads, at which point hidden
failures are exposed and cause unnecessary outages of intact equipment. This failure
mode is known as hidden failure [85], [86]. The existence of hidden failures in protection
systems worsens the stress on the system and reduces the reliability of system.
Notice that the operation of the power system is not directly affected by the
protection system. The protection system only guarantees the safe operation of the power
system and prevents faults from damaging the power equipment and spreading inside the
power system. According to these properties, the protection task also is categorized as
having indirect interdependency. If failures occur in the protective devices which are
directly responsible to trip the isolate the faulty region, it causes IEEI. Nevertheless,
some protection schemes, such as distance protection, pilot protection for short lines, and
circuit breaker failure protection, use peer-to-peer communication between protective
devices for decision making. So, any failure inside the communication network produces
INEI, because the protective devices will not receive the proper signal to trip the faulty
region.
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4.2.3

Indirect Cyber-Power Link (ICP-Link)

In the applications of indirect interdependencies, an indirect cyber-power link
(ICP-Link) represented by (4.1), symbolizes a single indirect interdependency between
the cyber element γ and the power element δ, which means that if the cyber element γ
fails or does not receive the required data, it impacts the performance of power element δ
against any coming failure.

  ( :  )

(4.1)

Assuming that cyber element γ works properly, the availability of an equivalent
two-state power element δ with the operation of cyber element γ is formulated as

A 



   

(4.2)

where  and   are the failure rate and repair rate, respectively.
However, when the indirect interdependency between γ and δ exists, if the cyber
element γ fails, the failure rate and repair rate of the power element δ would become ̂
and ̂ , respectively. Similarly, the availability of the power element δ without the
operation of cyber element γ equals

Aˆ  

̂

̂  ˆ

(4.3)

In other words, the existing indirect interdependency between the cyber element γ
and the power element δ results that the availability of the power element δ degrades
from A to Â if the cyber element γ is not available.
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4.3

Reliability Assessment of a Cyber-Power Network with Indirect
Interdependencies

The proposed procedure has three hierarchical steps. In the first step, the
probability table (P-Table) is generated. In the second and main step, state updating is
performed to update the failure rate and repair rate of an element in the power network.
After this procedure, the curtailed load in the power system is calculated for all states.
Based on the load curtailment values, the reliability indices are measured. Each of these
steps will be introduced in detail.
4.3.1

Creating the P-Table

The basis of the proposed algorithm is to find the expected load curtailment of the
cyber-power network. Therefore, information must be collected from various states of the
system and recorded in a P-Table. The P-Table consists of three terms: index i, system
state Фi, and state probability PrΦi . Each state Фi is a binary array in which each element
expresses the in-service/out-of-service status of a real device in the cyber and power
networks.
Φi  ( i,1 , i,2 ,..., i,NC , i,N C 1 ,..., i,NC  N P )

(4.4)

where φi,k is the status of element k in state i. If φi,k = 0, then element k in state i is
working. If φi,k =1 , then element k in state i has failed. Given that the cyber and power
networks have NC and NP elements, respectively, the length of Фi is NC+NP. When all
elements are presumed to be two-state, the probability of state i equals:

PrΦi 

Nc  N p



Ak

k 1
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( 1 ik )

Uk

 ik

(4.5)

In (4.5), Ak and Uk represent the availability and unavailability of the element k,
respectively.
4.3.2

State Updating

State updating occurs when a failure in an element of the cyber network impacts
the performance of the power element against potential future failures. Given a cyberpower network with only one indirect interdependency as expressed in (4.1), equations
(4.2), (4.3) and (4.5) result that the probability of all states that the cyber element γ fails,
changes in two different ways. If in that state the power element δ does not fail, the state
probability decreases, otherwise it increases. Therefore, the probability of the following
two states changes concurrently:
1. Фi in which failures occur in both cyber element γ and power element δ.(
 i ,  1 and  i ,  1 )

2. Фj in which failure occurs in the cyber element γ when no failure has
occurred in the power element δ. (  j ,  1 and  j ,  0 )

 j ,k   i,k
 0

k 
k 

(4.6)

If the failure of the element in the cyber network did not impact the failure and
repair rates of the power element, the probability of both elements failing concurrently
would be equal to

Pr i  U  
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(4.7)

where Uγ is the unavailability of cyber element γ. Accordingly, the probability of state Фj
is

Pr j  U  



(4.8)

   

However, when an indirect interdependency exists between the cyber element and
the power element, the probability of the two elements (γ and δ) failing concurrently
equals

PrNew
 U 
i

ˆ

ˆ  ̂

(4.9)

and

PrNew
 U 
j

̂

ˆ  ̂

(4.10)

Comparison between (4.7) and (4.9) and considering ̂   and ̂    assert
that PrNew
 Pr i , implying that the concurrent failures of two element γ and δ when an
i
ICP-Link   ( :  ) exists is more likely than that when δ and γ are independent.
The difference between (4.7) and (4.9) is modeled by state updating in that a
portion of the probability of the state Фj transfers to the state Фi. As a result, the
probability of Фi is updated as
PrΦNew
 PrΦi    PrΦ j
i

(4.11)

where ζ is the state updating coefficient, and ζ is the portion of Фj that transfers to Фi.
Equation (4.12) results from substituting (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10) in (4.11).
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̂
̂  ̂

 U 



  

  U  



  

(4.12)

 is directly calculated from (4.12) as

 

̂ (    ) 

(̂  ̂  )    

(4.13)

In reality,    and ̂  ̂  ; therefore, (4.13) is simplified as:

 

̂ 

̂ 

(4.14)

Equation (4.14) indicates that when the failure of the cyber element does not
change λ and μ of the power device,  = 0. Equations (4.7)-(4.10) entails
PrΦNew
 PrΦNew
 PrΦ j  PrΦi
j
i

(4.15)

From (4.15), PrΦNew is calculated as:
j

Pr ΦNew
 (1   )  Pr Φ j
j

(4.16)

In (4.14), ζ is the state updating coefficient with only one ICP-Link. A similar
approach can be used to generalize the equation when the NΓ ICP-Link exists.
Let us write equation (4.11) for a state illustrated in (4.4). The difference between
Фi and Фj only lies in the status of the power elements which have interdependency to
cyber network. After cancelling out the terms related to the availability of cyber elements
and non-interdependent power elements, (4.11) is only represented by the availability of
power elements as
102

̂

N P1

 ˆ
k 1

k

̂

N P



k

k

 ̂ k k N P1 1 ˆ k  ̂ k

N P1





N P



k 1    
k



k N P1

k



N P

 

k

1    
k

(4.17)
k

k 1    
k

k

k

where N P represents number of power element which have interdependency to the cyber


network and N P Stands for number of those power elements that have  i ,  1 . ζ is found
1
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Further, ζ is expressed as:
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(4.19)
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Similarly, given that  k   k and ̂  ̂  , the first simplification in (4.19) occurs
k

using

̂
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. Then, we get

k

  

k

k

N P1

 
k 1

ˆ    

̂

k

k

k

 ̂  k



103

k



k



k 1  
N P1

k

k

(4.20)

Apply the same simplification in (4.20) to further get
N
ˆ


 
k 1 ̂ 
k 1  
N P1

4.3.2.1

P1

k

k

k

k

(4.21)

State Updating Flowchart

Figure 4.1 shows the state updating procedure for state Фi. To indicate IEEI and
INEI, two Boolean variables, α and β, have been defined. If in state Фi, φi, γ = 1, then set
α=1 to represent an IEEI. If cyber element γ can work but does not obtain the requisite
data from the data sources, set β=1 to represent an INEI; otherwise, α=0 and β=0. For all
NΓ ICP-Links, the following three main steps are implemented:
Step 1: If the cyber element γk of the ICP-Link Γk fails in state Фi, set αk =1;

otherwise, αk =0.
Step 2: If αk =0, the cyber network’s connectivity will be evaluated to check if the

cyber element γk in the ICP-Link Γk works in state Фi but does not obtain
the requisite data from the data sources. If yes, then INEI exists and set βk
=1; otherwise, βk =0.
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Figure 4.1

State updating procedure for indirect interdependencies

Step 3: If αk =1 or βk =1 which means that there is either an IEEI or INEI, the

corresponding ζ is calculated by (4.21). In (4.21), only ICP-Links in which
their power elements are failed will contribute to the calculation of ζ.
Equation (4.22) with an indicator  i,k is a general expression of (4.21).
Accordingly, the probability of the states Фi and Фj are updated by (4.11)
and (4.16), respectively.
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 i ,k






(4.22)

Note that α is easily observable from the state of the network, as it is related to φi,γ ;
however, to determine β, a more sophisticated procedure by which to evaluate the cyber
network’s operation is required, which is presented as follows.
4.3.2.2

Connectivity Evaluation of Cyber Networks

The parameter β symbolizes the INEI in the cyber-power network. This parameter must
be determined by evaluating the cyber network. The main purpose of this evaluation is to
determine if all network nodes receive data from all required data sources. The basic
criterion is the connectivity between each node and all sources of data .Thus, this
procedure is called a connectivity check with multiple data sources.
In power system applications, Ethernet technology is inexorably becoming the leading
networking technology due to its ease of operation, high capacity, extendibility,
interoperability, and reliability. Loop or mesh topologies provide redundant paths in the
Ethernet network for data transfer and mitigate the risk of single failures. However, the
designed redundancy must be managed in order to avoid Ethernet loops in which data
frames are not able to find the destination node and circulate eternally, increasing
network traffic and communication latency [61]. The Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
(RSTP), as specified in IEEE 802.1D, perceives and logically breaks loops inside the
switches and prevents frames from flooding. The RSTP uses the spanning tree algorithm
to create a single active path between any two nodes [60]. After the RSTP arbitrarily
blocks certain branches in the cyber network, the following linear programming model
(4.23)-(4.27) is proposed to maximize the data connections.
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NB NR

 R
b1 r 1

(4.23)

rb

S.t.
NJ

ψ
j 1

mj

NS

NR

s1

r 1

T jb   ρmsb  S sb   ηmrb  Rrb

0  Rrb  1

b, m

b,r

S sb  0

b,s

   T jb  

b,j

(4.24)
(4.25)
(4.26)
(4.27)

where Rrb is the data received at the destination r from the type of data source b; Ssb is the
data sent from data source s for the type of data source b; Tjb is the data transferred
through the available connection j for the type of data source b; ψmj is the element of the
node- connection incidence matrix ψ in which ψmj=1 if the first point of the available
connection j is node m and ψmj=-1 if the second point of available connection j is node m;
otherwise, ψmj=0; ρmsb is the element of the node-source incidence matrix ρ in which
ρmsb=1 if the data source s for the type of data source b is at node m; otherwise, ρmsb=0;
and ηmrb is the element of the node-receiver incidence matrix η in which ηmrb =1 if the
data receiver r for the type of data source b is at the node m; otherwise, ηmrb =0.
After solving the proposed problem, Rrb is found. A data transmission is
successful if for all NB data sources, Rrb equals to 1. Therefore, βk is found


1 if
βw  
0 if


NB
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 Nb
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 Nb

rb

b1
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rb

(4.28)

βk determines whether the available data receiver r=γk can successfully receive the

required data from the required data sources. βk =1 indicates INEI in which the required
data cannot be transferred to the data receiver r.
4.3.3

Reliability Index Calculations

To measure the reliability indices, a DC optimal power flow (OPF) is performed
to minimize the load curtailment (4.29) while meeting certain constraints, such as nodal
power balance (4.30), line flow equations (4.31), capacity limits of generating units
(4.32), capacity limits of transmission lines (4.33), load shedding limits (4.34) as well as
the phase angle at the reference bus (4.35).

Min

ND

LCiT   LC d

(4.29)

d 1

S.t.
NL

NG

ND

ND

l 1

g 1

d 1

d 1

 κ ml  PLl   μmg  PG g   λmd  PDd   λmd  LC d
PLl 

θm  θn
xmn

l (m,n)

PG gmin  PG g  PG gmax

0  LCd  PDd
 PLmax
 PLl  PLmax
l
l
θ ref  0

g

m

(4.30)

(4.31)
(4.32)

d

(4.33)

l

(4.34)
(4.35)

where d is the index of the load; LCd is the load curtailment from the demand PDd; ND
and NL are the number of loads and transmission lines, respectively; the generation of
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generating unit g is shown by PGg; PLl symbolizes the active power transferred through
the available transmission line l; θm is the phase angle at bus m; κ is line-bus incidence
matrix in which κml =1 if bus m is the first point of the available transmission line l, if bus
m is the second point of the available line l then κml =-1, and κml =0 otherwise; μ stands
for gen-bus incidence matrix in which μmg =1 if bus m is the generator bus, and μmg =0
otherwise; λmd is the element of the load-bus incidence matrix λ in which λmd =1 if the bus
m is the load bus, and λmd =0 otherwise; and LC iT is the total load shedding for all loads.
After obtaining the load curtailment amount for all the states listed in the P-Table,
the LOLP and EENS are calculated as follows [21]:
LOLP   PrΦi  sgn(LCiT )

(4.36)

EENS   Pr i  LCiT

(4.37)

i

i

where sgn represents the sign function and is 1 and 0 when the input number is positive
and 0, respectively.
4.4

Case Studies

This section examines the reliability of the cyber-power network when indirect
interdependencies exist. The power system is a high-voltage substation with integrated
smart monitoring and digital protection systems. The proposed model is applied on this
cyber-power network, and two well-known reliability indices are calculated.
4.4.1

Case Description

Figure 4.2 shows the layout of a 230/63 kV substation with an H-type
configuration, in which one breaker is dedicated to each incoming 230 kV line and each
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power transformer. At 63 kV, for each outgoing feeder, one breaker is considered. Table
4.1 describes the various bays of the substation.
Table 4.1

Substation Description
Bays

Description

D01, D02

230 kV incoming feeder, 200 MVA, 100 km

D00

230 kV bus coupler

D03, D04

HV side of the transformers

F01, F02

HV side of the transformers

D01-T, D02-T

Power transformers, 230/63 kV feeder

F00

63 kV bus coupler

F11,F12, F13, F14, F21, F22,
63 kV Outgoing feeders, 50 MVA, 100 km
F23, F24

Monitoring devices are installed in this substation, and all measurements, events, and
disturbances are transferred to bay control units and bay protection units, which then
transmit all collected data through the digital communication network to servers S1 and
S2. The communication network is Ethernet LAN, which has star-wired and ring
topology.
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Figure 4.2

High voltage substation equipped with monitoring and protection

In the power system, all the breakers, transformers, and transmission lines have
non-zero failure rates. Also, in the cyber network, all the switches, protective devices,
and monitoring units have non-zero failure rates. As failure and repair rates vary for
different vendors and also depend on ambient conditions, typical values are given in this
study for the failure and repair rates of cyber and power elements, as listed in Tables 4.2
and 4.3, respectively.
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Table 4.2

Elements

Abbreviation

λ (Failures/Year)

µ (Occ/Year)

Circuit breakers

-B

0.037

73

Transformers

-T

0.068

135.9

Transmission lines (100 km)

-L

1

98

Table 4.3

4.4.1.2

Failure and Repair Rates of Power Elements

Failure and Repair Rates for Cyber Elements
Elements

Abbreviation

λ (Failures/Year)

µ (Occ/Year)

Protection units

.P

0.5

73

Monitoring units

.M

1

73

Switch

.C

0.5

73

Monitoring System

Transformers and circuit breakers are monitored in human machine interfaces
(HMI) through digital communication systems. This monitoring achieves two substantial
outcomes. Imminent faults are detected before catastrophic failures and long-term
outages. Also, condition-based maintenance, which is more efficient than periodic
maintenance, can be conducted.
Power transformers are one of the most expensive apparatuses in power
substations that are subject to component failures. The oil and winding temperatures are
monitored. The maximum loading is limited by the operating temperature of the
transformer. If the transformer is operated in high temperatures, the insulation will be
worn out earlier than expected [79]. For a typical high-voltage transformer, given that the
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monitoring system only monitors the winding and oil temperatures, 32% of failures are
avoided, and the repair rate increases 86% [78], [87].
Breakers require monitoring to ensure their reliable operation and to prevent
critical damage. The gas pressure and number of operations are two factors that require
monitoring. Reference [80] reported that after implementing physical and condition
monitoring functions, about 87.6% of SF6 circuit breaker failures can be predicted. Thus,
the failure rate without monitoring is 8.13 times higher than that with monitoring.
Table 4.4 illustrates the two ICP-Links between D01.M and the corresponding
breaker and transformer. Similar ICP-Links can be defined between other breakers and
transformers and their dedicated monitoring devices.
Table 4.4

4.4.1.3

CP-Links between Cyber and Power Networks
ICP-Link

(γ:δ)

ˆ / 

̂ / 

Γ1

(D04.M:D04-B)

8.13

0.53

Γ2

(D04.M:D04-T)

1.47

0.54

Protection System

For 230 kV lines and the transformers, main and backup protection relays are
considered. The main protection relays protect the 63 kV outgoing feeders. If a fault
occurs, the relays are set to operate selectively to maintain the power system’s
dependability and security [89].
The failure of a protective relay causes either the backup protection relays or the
upstream relays to operate. In the case of upstream operation, more feeders will be out of
service, which implies that this failure increases the failure rate of the nearby feeders.
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For instance, if a short circuit occurs in feeder F23 and the relay of this feeder is out of
service, the relay of the incoming F20 will operate and will trip the breaker located on the
lower portion of the transformer. Accordingly, all adjacent feeders, F21, F22, and F24,
will be de-energized. This means that the failure rates of these feeders increase indirectly
due to the protective device failure of another feeder. Likewise, F12.P has indirect
dependencies with F11-L, F13-L, and F14-L. A similar discussion holds true for other
bays, as well. Table 4.5 lists the ICP-Links dedicated for interdependencies between
F11.P and the adjacent feeders (F12-L, F13-L, and F14-L).
4.4.2

Case Results

To assess the reliability of a cyber-power network, the state updating coefficient ζ
for all states must be calculated. Table 4.6 shows ζ of some select states. In the first
column, only failed elements are listed and calculation results from (4.20) and (4.21) are
listed in second and third columns, respectively.
Table 4.5

ICP-Links between Cyber and Power Networks
ICP-Link

(γ:δ)

̂ / 

̂ / 

Γ3

(F11.P :F12-L)

2

1

Γ4

(F11.P:F13-L)

2

1

Γ5

(F11.P:F14-L)

2

1
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Table 4.6

State Updating Coefficients for Three Select States
ζ

ζ

(Equation (20))

(Equation (21))

(D04.M,D04-B)

0.00721

0.00726

(F11.P, F12-L)

0.01

0.01014

(D04.M, F11.P, D04-B, F12-L)

0.000158

0.00016

State

As an example, ζ of the state for which D04.M and D04-B are out of service is
calculated. From (4.20), ζ is found:

 

8.13* 0.037 * (0.037  73)
0.037

 0.00721
(8.13* 0.037  0.54* 73) * 73
73

(4.38)

From (4.21), the approximate value of ζ equals:

 

8.13 * 0.037 0.037

 0.00726
0.54 * 73
73

(4.39)

Comparison between above results certifies that ζ calculated by (4.21) is an
acceptable approximation of (4.20). Also, the ζ calculated by (4.21) is always larger than
its exact value. As larger ζ means that when a failure occurs in the cyber network, the
probability of failure in the interdependent power element will increase, equation (4.21)
actually exhibits a worse situation of (4.20).
A reliability assessment is performed for the following five scenarios and the
LOLP and EENS of the substation for various scenarios are presented in Table 4.7.
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Scenario 1: This scenario is a base case in which the power system is equipped

with fully reliable protection and monitoring systems.
Scenario 2: In this case, the power system is assumed without protection and

monitoring systems.
Scenario 3: In this scenario, only the failure of the monitoring system is

considered, and other sectors of the cyber networks are failure free.
Scenario 4: In this scenario, only the failure of the protection system is

considered, and other sectors of the cyber networks are failure free.
Scenario 5: In this scenario, elements of both the protection and monitoring

systems may fail.
Table 4.7

Reliability Indices Due to the Failure of the Protection and Monitoring
Systems
LOLP

EENS

LOLP

EENS

(%)

(p.u)

Inc. %

Inc.%

1. Protection and monitoring systems are fully reliable.

1.21

0.061

-

-

2. Protection and monitoring systems are not available.

2.0933

0.1135

73

86

3. Failure in the monitoring system

1.2257

0.0619

1.3

1.4

4. Failure in the protection system

1.2233

0.0623

1.1

2.1

5. Failure in the monitoring and protection systems

1.2378

0.063

2.3

3.3

Scenarios

A comparison between the reliability indices of the scenarios yields the following
observations:

116



LOLP and EENS of the power system without monitoring and protection
are 73% and 86% more than that with fully reliable monitoring and
protection systems. It implies that both monitoring and protection are
crucial for reliable operation of power systems.



Failures in the protection system degrade the EENS of the power system
more than failures in the monitoring system. However, failures in the
monitoring system impact the LOLP more than those in the protection
system. Also, protection system failures noticeably impact the EENS more
than the LOLP. Because when the protection system fails, the failure is
expanded to adjacent feeders causing more customers de-energized.



It is observed that both LOLP and EENS increment in the scenario 5 is
less than the sum of those in scenarios 3 and 4. This behavior is related to
nonlinearity of (4.22) for those states that have more than one indirect
interdependency. For example, when a state has two indirect
interdependencies (failures in one monitoring and one protection devices),
the value of ζ, is smaller than sum of coefficients in the same state for two
scenarios 3 and 4. According to (4.11) and (4.16), ζ directly changes Pr 
and Pr j resulting the change in LOLP and EENS.

4.5

Conclusion

With recent advances in smart grid applications, the incorporation of failures in
the cyber network must be determined. This chapter proposed a novel reliability model
that updates the probability of states when a failure occurs in the cyber network. To
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i

assess the operation of the cyber network, an optimization model was designed that
maximizes the data connectivity in the cyber network with multiple data sources. The
model was applied to a typical substation, and failures of the monitoring and protection
systems were considered. The results of the case study verify that failures in the
protection and monitoring systems degrade the power system’s reliability
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CHAPTER V
SMARG: A NEW TOOL FOR SMART GRID RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT

5.1

Introduction

In order to justify the proposed models for direct and indirect interdependencies, a
new software is developed. This tool, named SMARG, is best suited for different types of
smart grid applications e.g. microgrids and substation automation systems.
In this chapter a brief description of this tool is presented. In section 5.2 main
standard capabilities of SMARG is introduced. Section 5.3 illustrates some technical
features of the SMARG. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section 5.4.
5.2

Standard Capabilities

Most of all prominent software suits provide common capabilities to improve the
software operation, minimize training efforts and simplify the use of software. These
capabilities include graphical tools, keyboard shortcuts, file operations and data exchange
with other software suits. SMARG provides standard capabilities, some of which are
presented in this section.
5.2.1

Network Editor

The Network Editor is the state-of-the-art graphical user interface underlying the
SMARG analyses modules. It offers the user with great flexibility in building the
diagrams of cyber and power networks as well as providing a wide variety of options to
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modify the displays and outputs. The SMARG Graphical Interface significantly improves
the power and efficiency of the data entry and make possible to build large scale
networks swiftly. It enables the user to schematically construct a network, evaluate the
calculation outputs, and illustrate the data in a completely integrated graphical
environment. Network editor has following capabilities:


Zoom and pan



Copy/Cut and Paste shortcuts



Select and move On Screen

Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show snapshots of power and cyber networks in SMARG.

Figure 5.1

A drawing of a power network in SMARG
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Figure 5.2

A drawing of a cyber network in SMARG

SMARG supports standard file operations, including New, Open, Save, and
SaveAs. SMARG saves its documents with (*.smg) extension. Also, SMARG is
multiple-document interface (MDI) software that can handle multiple networks
simultaneously. As figure 5.3 illustrates, many forms can be opened in a same time in
SMARG.
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Figure 5.3

5.2.2

SMARG is MDI software

Export to Microsoft Office suites

To better analyze the results, SMARG can export each table as a Microsoft Excel
file (*.xls). Figure (5.4) shows an example of Excel export.
All schematic diagrams can be exported as a picture file (*.jpg) or a Microsoft
Visio file (*.vsd) for additional uses. Figure (5.5) visualizes an example of a network
exported to the Microsoft Visio.
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Figure 5.4

SMARG exports tables to Microsoft Excel spreadsheet files

Figure 5.5

SMARG exports the networks to Microsoft Visio drawing files
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5.3

Technical Features

In addition to capabilities that a standard software suit should have, SMARG
provides advanced features some of them are discussed in the following.
5.3.1

Results and Outputs

After running the reliability study, SMARG generates all detail calculation tables.
Figure (5.6) shows a snapshot of contingency tables. Figure (5.7) shows the final value of
indices.

Figure 5.6

Detail of calculation is available for future studies
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Figure 5.7

5.3.2

Output indices in SMARG

Scripting

One of the most powerful features of SMARG is scripting ability, which enables
standard coding inside the SMARG and accessing the variables. Scripting provides the
highest level of flexibility to implement solutions. Script can be archived for future uses.
Fig. 5.8 illustrates a script which developed by the SMARG.
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Figure 5.8

5.3.3

Scripting inside the SMARG

Database

SMARG is network-based software in which, all information is collected inside a
common database. All users can access and use the collected information. The main
advantage of this ability is that all users access to unique information. Users with
different access level can read/update the information inside the database. The database
codes are implemented by Structured Querry Language (SQL) and in the Microsoft
access platform. Fig 5.9 shows a table of the SMARG database.
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Figure 5.9

5.4

A table of the SMARG database

Conclusion

In this chapter, a brief description about SMARG is presented. SMARG is a
powerful piece of software that can be applied in various smart grid applications. A
graphical user interface empowers the user to easily implement the network structure
easily
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

6.1

Conclusions

Now, more than ever, the reliable operation of power systems depends on an
extensive application of communication and information technology that enables power
engineers to design power systems with state-of-the-art control, protection and operation.
The incorporation and application of real-time communications in power systems enable
the dynamic flow of both power and information to accommodate the efficient delivery
of power system services. The ever-increasing applications of cyber network, however,
intensify the risk of failure and have adverse effects on the resilience of the power
system. Failures in the information infrastructure have been contributing significant
factors in several major recent power outages.
In this dissertation, cyber-power interdependencies in smart grid applications are
studied and an all-inclusive categorization of interdependencies is proposed. Cyberpower interdependencies are generally categorized to direct and indirect. In order to
evaluate the impact of direct cyber-power interdependencies on the reliability indices,
two optimization models are introduced to maximize the data connection in the cyber
network and minimize the load shedding in the power network. Two applications of
cyber-power systems, automated substations and micro grids, are discussed and certain
cyber-power interdependencies are listed as examples.
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A study regarding smart grid monitoring, which is an application of indirect
interdependencies, is presented in chapter 3 and a mathematical model is proposed to
assess its impact on power grid reliability. Based on a multiple-state Markov chain
model, the failure and repair rates of power components with and without monitoring
provisions are determined and compared. The proposed formulation incorporates the
failure rates of the monitoring systems themselves and the impact on system/component
reliability.
In chapter 4, a reliability model is proposed to evaluate the reliability of a cyberpower network when indirect interdependencies exist. This model updates the probability
of states when a failure occurs in the cyber network. In this study, failures of the
monitoring and protection systems, as two applications of indirect interdependencies,
were considered.
6.2

Future Works

The results of presented studies certify that failures in the cyber networks degrade
the power system’s reliability. Therefore, increasing the reliability of the cyber network
enhances the reliability of the power network. Our future works are listed as follows,


A key issue in the design of the cyber network is its network topology. In
recent years, various network architectures based on different topologies
by different vendors are introduced. The proposed algorithms can be
applied for developing an optimization problem for the design of cyber
network to achieve the higher level of reliability for the power network.
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Nowadays, a power device, e.g. HV transformer and circuit breaker, is
sold by some optional monitoring and protection functions. The proposed
Markov model in chapter 3 is a useful tool to find the optimum degree of
monitoring and protection for the power device.



Although the reliability of communication networks is considerably
improved, many uncertainties, such as latency and data loss, still remain.
As a future work, this study may be extended to consider the impact of
other network parameters on the operation of the power network.



Redundancy in the protection is an important issue. Due to importance of
protection task, highest level of reliability is always demanded. The model
proposed in the chapter 4 can be further used to measure the reliability of
different protection functions in a more detail design.

130

REFERENCES
R.R. Rajkumar, ,I. Lee,L. Sha, and J. Stankovic,"Cyber-physical systems: the next
computing revolution," In Proceedings of the 47th Design Automation
Conference (pp. 731-736). ACM, 2010.
H. Farhangi, “The Path of the Smart Grid,” IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, Vol. 8, No.
1, Jan./Feb. 2010, pp. 19-28.
D. Karlsson, M. Hemmingsson, and S. Lindahl, “Wide area system monitoring and
control,” IEEE Power Energy, vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 68–76, Sep./Oct. 2004.
S. Massoud Amin and B.F. Wollenberg, “Toward a smart grid: power delivery for the
21st century,” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, Vol. 3, No. 5 Sept.-Oct. 2005,
pp. 34-41.
Mohagheghi, Salman, Fang Yang, and Bamdad Falahati. "Impact of demand response on
distribution system reliability," Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2011
IEEE. IEEE, 2011.
F.Rahimi and A.Ipakchi, "Demand Response as a Market Resource Under the Smart Grid
Paradigm," IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol.1, no.1, pp.82-88.
Y. Han and Y. H. Song, “Condition monitoring techniques for electrical equipment-a
literature survey,” IEEE Trans. Power Del., vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 4–13, Jan. 2003.
Electric substation monitoring, Flir Solution Series. [Online]. Available:
http://infraredsys.com/process.pdf
A. Bourgault, "Sturdy but sensitive to heat: the impact of a winding temperature on
power transformer reliability," Power and Energy Magazine, IEEE, vol.3, no.5,
pp. 42- 47, Sept.-Oct. 2005.
R.E. Brown, "Impact of smart grid on distribution system design," Power and Energy
Society General Meeting , 2008 IEEE.
McDaniel, Patrick, and Stephen McLaughlin. "Security and privacy challenges in the
smart grid." Security & Privacy, IEEE 7.3 (2009): 75-77.

131

Ten, C. W., Liu, C. C., & Govindarasu, M. (2008, May). Cyber-vulnerability of power
grid monitoring and control systems. In Proceedings of the 4th annual workshop
on Cyber security and information intelligence research: developing strategies to
meet the cyber security and information intelligence challenges ahead (p. 43).
ACM.
S.M. Rinaldi, J.P. Peerenboom, T.K. Kelly, “Identifying, understanding and analyzing
critical infrastructure dependencies,” IEEE Control Systems magazine, vol. 21, no
6, December 2001, pp. 11-25.
D.E. Newman, B. Nkei, B.A. Carreras, I. Dobson, V.E. Lynch, and P. Gradney, "Risk
Assessment in Complex Interacting Infrastructure Systems," System Sciences,
2005. HICSS '05. Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International, pp. 63c63c.
M.G. Adamiak, A.P. Apostolov, M.M. Begovic, C.F. Henville, K.E. Martin, G.L. Michel,
A.G. Phadke, and J.S. Thorp,“Wide Area Protection—Technology and
Infrastructures,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Volume 21, Issue 2,
April 2006.
S. Rahman, M. Pipattanasomporn and Y. Teklu, “Intelligent Distributed Autonomous
Power Systems (IDAPS),” In Proc. 2007 the IEEE PES Annual General Meeting,
Tampa, Florida, 8pp.
Ten Chee-Wooi, Liu Chen-Ching, and M. Govindarasu, "Anomaly extraction and
correlations for power infrastructure cyber systems," Systems, IEEE International
Conference on Man and Cybernetics, 2008, pp.7-12.
D. Kirschen, and F. Bouffard, “Keep the lights on and the Information Flowing, a new
framework for analyzing power system security,” IEEE Power and Energy
Magazine, pp. 50-60, January-February 2009.
G. Andersson, P. Donalek., R. Farmer, N. Hatziargyriou, I. Kamwa, P. Kundur, N.
Martins, J. Paserba, P. Pourbeik, J. Sanchez-Gasca, R. Schulz, A. Stankovic, C.
Taylor, V. Vittal, “Causes of the 2003 major grid blackouts in North America
and Europe and recommended means to improve system dynamic performance,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1922-1928, November
2005.
L. Pereira, “Cascade to black [system blackouts],” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine,
Vol. 2, Issue 3, May-Jun 2004, pp. 54 – 57.
R. Billinton and R. N. Allan, Reliability evaluation of power systems. New York:
Plenum, 1996.

132

C. Singh, A. Sprintson, A. , "Reliability assurance of cyber-physical power systems,"
Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2010 IEEE , pp.1-6, 25-29 July
2010.
Ten Chee-Wooi, Liu Chen-Ching, and M. Govindarasu, "Anomaly extraction and
correlations for power infrastructure cyber systems," Systems, IEEE International
Conference on Man and Cybernetics, 2008, pp.7-12.
Z. Y. Dong and P. Zhang, Emerging Techniques in Power System Analysis: Springer,
2009.
T. S. Sidhu, S. Injeti,M.G. Kanabar, and P.P. Parikh, "Packet scheduling of GOOSE
messages in IEC 61850 based substation intelligent electronic devices (IEDs)," In
Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2010 IEEE.
C. Hoga and G.Wong. "IEC 61850: Open Communication in Practice in Substations," In
Proc. IEEE Power Systems Conf.and Exposition, pages 618–623, 2004.
S.S. Tarlochan, Y. Yujie, “Modelling and Simulation for Performance Evaluation of
IEC61850-Based Substation Communication Systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Delivery, 2007, Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp. 1482-1489.
P.P Parikh, M.G. Kanabar, T.S. Sidhu, "Opportunities and challenges of wireless
communication technologies for smart grid applications," Power and Energy
Society General Meeting, 2010 IEEE , pp.1-7.
Michael Duck and Richard Read, Data Communications and Computer Networks for
Computer Scientists and Engineers. Second Edition, 2003, Pearson, Prentice Hall.
F. Gebali, Analysis of Computer and Communication Networks . Springer Science
Business Media, LLC, New York, 2008.
R. Pallos, J. Farkas, I. Moldován and C. Lukovszki, “Performance of Rapid Spanning
Tree Protocol in Access and Metro Networks,” AccessNets 2007, Ottawa, Canada,
August 22-24, 2007.
Song, S., Huang, J., Kappler, P., Freimark, R., Gustin, J., & Kozlik, T. (2000). Faulttolerant Ethernet for IP-based process control: A demonstration. InDependable
Systems and Networks, 2000. DSN 2000. Proceedings International Conference
on (pp. 361-366). IEEE.
Intel, "High Availability Server Clustering Solutions, 2002. [Online].
Available:http://www.intel.com/design/network/papers/25157401.pdf
F. Katiraei, R. Iravani, N. Hatziargyriou, and A. Dimeas, “Microgrids Management,”
IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 54- 65, May/June 2008,
2008.
133

L. Anderson, C. Brunner, and F. Engler, “Substation automation based on IEC 61850
with new process-close technologies,” in IEEE PowerTech Conference, vol. 2,
Bologna, Italy, June 2003, p. 6.
Communication networks and systems in substation, International Standard, IEC 618509-1, First edition, 2003-05.
Jailani, Norleyza, and Ahmed Patel. "FMS: A computer network fault management
system based on the OSI standards," Malaysian journal of computer Science 11.1
(1998): 22-31.
T. Dean,"Network+ guide to networks,4th edition," Course Technology, 2005.
Qureshi, M., Raza, A., Kumar, D., Kim, S. S., Song, U. S., Park, M. W., ... & Park, B. S.
(2008, April). A survey of communication network paradigms for substation
automation. In Power Line Communications and Its Applications, 2008. ISPLC
2008. IEEE International Symposium on (pp. 310-315). IEEE.
S. Mohagheghi, J. Stoupis and Z. Wang, “Communication protocols and networks for
power systems-current status and future trends,”Power Systems Conference and
Exposition, 2009. PSCE'09. IEEE/PES (pp. 1-9). IEEE.
L.L. Pullum, Software Fault Tolerance Techniques and Implementation. Artech House,
2001.
Jiménez-Peris, R., Patiño-Martínez, M., Kemme, B., & Alonso, G. (2002). Improving the
scalability of fault-tolerant database clusters. In Distributed Computing Systems,
2002. Proceedings. 22nd International Conference on (pp. 477-484). IEEE.
M. R. Lyu. Software Fault Tolerance. John Wiley & Sons, 1995.
Curtin, Matt. "Introduction to network security." Kent information Inc (1997).
M. Ingram, R. Ehlers, “Toward effective substation automation,” IEEE Power and
Energy Magazine, Vol. 5(3) , pp. 67-73. 2007.
S. Kennedy, “Reliability Evaluation of Islanded Microgrids with Stochastic Distributed
Generation”, Power & Energy Society General Meeting, IEEE, pp. 1-8, Jul. 2009.
S. R. Bull, “Renewable energy today and tomorrow,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 89, no. 8, pp.
1216–1226, Aug. 2001.
N. Jayawarna , X. Wut , Y. Zhangt , N. Jenkins , M. Barnes, “Stability of a MicroGrid,”
Proc. of the 3rd IET Int. Conf. on Power Electronics, Machines and Drives,
Dublin, Ireland, March 2006.

134

P. Ledesma, J. Usaola, and J. L. Rodriguez, “Transient stability of a fixed speed wind
farm,” Renewable Energy, vol. 28, pp. 1341-1355, 2003.
Lim Seong-Il Lim, Choi Myeon-Song, and Lee Seung-Jae, "Adaptive protection setting
and coordination for power distribution systems," Power Systems Conference,
2006. MEPCON 2006. Eleventh International Middle East , vol.1, pp.129-134.
I.H. Lim, S.J. Lee, M.S. Choi, P. Crossley, "Multi-Agent System-based Protection
Coordination of Distribution Feeders,” Intelligent Systems Applications to Power
Systems, 2007. ISAP 2007., pp.1-6.
Hui Wan, K.K.Li and K.P.Wong, “Multi-Agent Application of Substation Protection
Coordination with Distributed Generators,” European Transactions on Electrical
Power, Vol.16, Issue 5, September, 2006, pp. 495-506.
P.K Lee, LL. Lai, “Smart Metering in Micro-Grid Applications,” in Proc. of the IEEE
Power and Energy Society General Meeting, July 2009.
Madhav D. Manjrekar, Rick Kiefemdorf, etc, “Power Electronic Transformers for Utility
Applications,” Trans Of China electrotechnical society, vol.16, no.5, pp35-39,
2000.
M. McGranaghan, D. Von Dollen, P. Myrda, and E. Gunther, “Utility experience with
developing a smart grid roadmap”, in Proc. IEEE PES General Meeting 2008,
July 20-24, 2008, pp. 1-5.
X. Mamo, S. Mallet, T. Coste, S. Grenard, “Distribution automation: The cornerstone for
smart grid development strategy,” IEEE Power & Energy Society General
Meeting, 2009, pp. 1-6.
H. Tram, “Technical and operation considerations in using smart metering for outage
management,” Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exposition, 2008.
T&D. IEEE/PES, pp. 1-3.
B. Falahati, Y. Fu,"A study on interdependencies of cyber-power networks in smart grid
applications", IEEE ISGT 2012, Washington D.C., DC, 2012.
T. H. Cormen, C. E. Leiserson, and R. L. Rivest, Introduction to algorithms. The MIT
Press, 1990.

M.P. Pozzuoli, R. Moorem, "Ethernet in the substation," Power Engineering
Society General Meeting, 2006. IEEE.
B. Falahati, M. J. Mousavi, M. Vakilian," Latency considerations in IEC 61850-enabled
substation automation systems," Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2011.
PES '11. IEEE .
135

N. Jayawarna , X. Wut , Y. Zhangt , N. Jenkins , M. Barnes “ Stability of a microgrid,”
Proc. of the 3rd IET Int. Conf. on Power Electronics, Machines and Drives,
Dublin, Ireland, March 2006.
A. Chung and M. McGranaghan, “Functions of a local controller to coordinate
distributed resources in a smart grid”, Power and Energy Society General
Meeting, pp 1, 2008.
P. Nyeng,J. Ostergaard, , "Information and communications systems for control-by-price
of distributed energy resources and flexible demand," Smart Grid, IEEE
Transactions on , vol.2, no.2, pp.334-341, June 2011.
M. Kezunovic, “Monitoring of power system topology in real-time”, In Proc. 39-th
International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, Jan. 2006.
Liu Xiong, Wang Peng, Poh Chiang Loh , "A hybrid AC/DC microgrid and its
coordination control," Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on , vol.2, no.2, pp.278286, June 2011.
Y.A. Mohamed, A.A. Radwan, "Hierarchical control system for robust microgrid
operation and seamless mode transfer in active distribution systems," Smart Grid,
IEEE Transactions on , vol.2, no.2, pp.352-362, June 2011.
"Reliability consideration from the integration of smart grid,"NERC, December 2010,
[Online]. Available: http://www.nerc.com/files/SGTF_Report_Final_ posted.pdf
F. Li, W. Qiao, H. Sun, H.Wan, J.Wang, Y. Xia, Z. Xu, and P. Zhang, “Smart
transmission grid: Vision and framework,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 2,
Sep. 2010.
S. Kamireddy, N.N. Schulz, A.K. Srivastava, A.K , "Comparison of state estimation
algorithms for extreme contingencies," Power Symposium, 2008. NAPS '08. 40th
North American , vol., no., pp.1-5, 28-30 Sept. 2008.
M. McGranaghan, D. Von Dollen, P. Myrda, and E. Gunther, “Utility experience with
developing a smart grid roadmap”, in Proc. IEEE PES General Meeting, July 2024, 2008, pp. 1-5.
C. Zhongqin and F. Wu, "Information visualization in control centers," Securing Critical
Infrastructures conference, Grenoble, October 2004.
T. J. Overbye and J. D. Weber, “New methods for the visualization of electric power
system information,” in Proc. IEEE Symp. Inform. Visualization, Salt Lake City,
UT, Oct. 2000, pp. 131c–136c.
T. X. Zhu, S. K. Tso, and K. L. Lo, “An investigation into the OLTC effects on voltage
collapse,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 15, pp. 515–521, May 2000.
136

T.J. Overbye and J.D. Weber, “Visualization of Power System Data,” Proc. 33rd Ann.
Hawaii Int’l Conf. System Sciences (HICSS-33), 2000.
P. Zhang, F. Li, and N. Bhatt, “Next-generation monitoring, analysis, and control for the
future smart control center,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 186–192,
Sep. 2010.
C. Kane, "Monitoring technologies for large power transformers," Petroleum and
Chemical Industry Conference (PCIC), 58th Annual IEEE , 2011, vol., no., pp.1-8
C. Bengtsson, “Status and trends in transformer monitoring,” IEEE Trans. Power
Delivery, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 1379–1384, Jul. 1996.
G. Betta, A. Pietrosanto, and A. Scaglione, “An enhanced fiber-optic temperature sensor
system for power transformer monitoring,” IEEE Trans. Instrum. Meas., vol. 50,
no. 5, pp. 1138–1143, Oct. 2001.
A. L. J. Janssen, J. H. Brunke, C. R. Heising, and W. Lan, “CIGRE WG 13.06 studies on
the reliability of single pressure SF6-gas high-voltage circuit-breakers,” IEEE
Trans. Power Delivery, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 274–282, Jan. 1996.
M.A. Azarm, R. Bari, Y. Meng, Z. Musicki, "Electrical substation reliability evaluation
with emphasis on evolving interdependence on communication
infrastructure," Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, 2004
International Conference on , pp.487,491, Sept. 2004
B. Falahati, Y. Fu,"A Study on Interdependencies of Cyber-Power Networks in Smart
Grid Applications", IEEE ISGT 2012, Washington D.C., DC, 2012.
B. Falahati, Y. Fu, W. Lei, "Reliability assessment of smart grid considering direct cyberpower interdependencies," IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol.3, no.3,
pp.1515-1524, Sept. 2012.
Y. Han and Y. H. Song, “Condition monitoring techniques for electrical equipment-a
literature survey,” IEEE Trans. Power Del., vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 4–13, Jan. 2003.
Y. Fang A.P.S. Meliopoulos, G.J. Cokkinides, Q. Binh Dam, "Bulk power system
reliability assessment considering protection system hidden failures," Bulk Power
System Dynamics and Control - VII. Revitalizing Operational Reliability, 2007
iREP Symposium pp.1,8, 19-24 Aug. 2007.
Y. Xingbin, C. Singh, "A practical approach for integrated power system vulnerability
analysis with protection failures," Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on , vol.19,
no.4, pp.1811,1820, Nov. 2004.
B. Falahati, Y. Fu, M.J. Mousavi, "Reliability modeling and evaluation of power systems
with smart monitoring," Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on , no.99, pp.1-9.
137

Report to the Planning Committee,"Reliability Fundamentals of System Protection",
NERC, December 2010.[Online]. vailable: http://www.nerc
.com/docs/pc/spctf/Protection%20System%20Reliability%20Fundamentals_Appr
oved_20101208.pdf.
NERC System Protection and Control Task Force, Protection System Reliability
Redundancy of Protection System Elements, 2008.", [Online].Available:
http://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/spctf/Redundancy_Te ch_Ref_1-14-09.pdf.

138

